All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>,
	Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 3/5] s390/uv: convert PG_arch_1 users to only work on small folios
Date: Thu,  4 Apr 2024 18:36:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240404163642.1125529-4-david@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240404163642.1125529-1-david@redhat.com>

Now that make_folio_secure() may only set PG_arch_1 for small folios,
let's convert relevant remaining UV code to only work on (small) folios
and simply reject large folios early. This way, we'll never end up
touching PG_arch_1 on tail pages of a large folio in UV code.

The folio_get()/folio_put() for functions that are documented to already
hold a folio reference look weird and it should probably be removed.
Similarly, uv_destroy_owned_page() and uv_convert_owned_from_secure()
should really consume a folio reference instead. But these are cleanups for
another day.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/page.h |  1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c        | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
index 54d015bcd8e3..b64384872c0f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __phys_addr(unsigned long x, bool is_31bit)
 #define pfn_to_phys(pfn)	((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT)
 
 #define phys_to_page(phys)	pfn_to_page(phys_to_pfn(phys))
+#define phys_to_folio(phys)	page_folio(phys_to_page(phys))
 #define page_to_phys(page)	pfn_to_phys(page_to_pfn(page))
 #define folio_to_phys(page)	pfn_to_phys(folio_pfn(folio))
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index adcbd4b13035..9c0113b26735 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -134,14 +134,17 @@ static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
  */
 int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
 {
-	struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
+	struct folio *folio = phys_to_folio(paddr);
 	int rc;
 
-	get_page(page);
+	if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
+		return 0;
+
+	folio_get(folio);
 	rc = uv_destroy_page(paddr);
 	if (!rc)
-		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
-	put_page(page);
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
+	folio_put(folio);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -169,14 +172,17 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
  */
 int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
 {
-	struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
+	struct folio *folio = phys_to_folio(paddr);
 	int rc;
 
-	get_page(page);
+	if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
+		return 0;
+
+	folio_get(folio);
 	rc = uv_convert_from_secure(paddr);
 	if (!rc)
-		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
-	put_page(page);
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
+	folio_put(folio);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -457,33 +463,34 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page);
  */
 int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page)
 {
+	struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	/* Hugepage cannot be protected, so nothing to do */
-	if (PageHuge(page))
+	/* Large folios cannot be protected, so nothing to do */
+	if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * PG_arch_1 is used in 3 places:
 	 * 1. for kernel page tables during early boot
 	 * 2. for storage keys of huge pages and KVM
-	 * 3. As an indication that this page might be secure. This can
+	 * 3. As an indication that this small folio might be secure. This can
 	 *    overindicate, e.g. we set the bit before calling
 	 *    convert_to_secure.
 	 * As secure pages are never huge, all 3 variants can co-exists.
 	 */
-	if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags))
+	if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = uv_pin_shared(page_to_phys(page));
+	rc = uv_pin_shared(folio_to_phys(folio));
 	if (!rc) {
-		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	rc = uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+	rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
 	if (!rc) {
-		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-04 16:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-04 16:36 [PATCH v1 0/5] s390: page_mapcount(), page_has_private() and PG_arch_1 David Hildenbrand
2024-04-04 16:36 ` [PATCH v1 1/5] s390/uv: don't call wait_on_page_writeback() without a reference David Hildenbrand
2024-04-10 17:21   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-11  8:24     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-11 13:13       ` Alexander Gordeev
2024-04-04 16:36 ` [PATCH v1 2/5] s390/uv: convert gmap_make_secure() to work on folios David Hildenbrand
2024-04-05  3:29   ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-05  7:09     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-10 17:32       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-10 17:31   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-11  9:09     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-04 16:36 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-04-05  3:36   ` [PATCH v1 3/5] s390/uv: convert PG_arch_1 users to only work on small folios Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-11 10:41     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-10 17:42   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-11 10:38     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-04 16:36 ` [PATCH v1 4/5] s390/uv: update PG_arch_1 comment David Hildenbrand
2024-04-10 17:19   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-04 16:36 ` [PATCH v1 5/5] s390/hugetlb: convert PG_arch_1 code to work on folio->flags David Hildenbrand
2024-04-05  3:42 ` [PATCH v1 0/5] s390: page_mapcount(), page_has_private() and PG_arch_1 Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-05  7:07   ` David Hildenbrand

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240404163642.1125529-4-david@redhat.com \
    --to=david@redhat.com \
    --cc=agordeev@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=borntraeger@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=frankja@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=imbrenda@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=svens@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=thuth@redhat.com \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.