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From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Eduardo Habkost" <eduardo@habkost.net>,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Yanan Wang" <wangyanan55@huawei.com>,
	"Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 11:48:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240411094830.1337658-3-kraxel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240411094830.1337658-1-kraxel@redhat.com>

If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which
case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.

It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching
and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot
verification.

Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but
any efi binary via direct kernel boot.

Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux
kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...

Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
 hw/i386/x86.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
index ffbda48917fd..765899eebe43 100644
--- a/hw/i386/x86.c
+++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
      * kernel on the other side of the fw_cfg interface matches the hash of the
      * file the user passed in.
      */
-    if (!sev_enabled()) {
+    if (!sev_enabled() && protocol > 0) {
         memcpy(setup, header, MIN(sizeof(header), setup_size));
     }
 
-- 
2.44.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11  9:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11  9:48 [PATCH 0/5] x86/loader: secure boot support for direct kernel load Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11  9:48 ` [PATCH 1/5] vl: fix qemu_validate_options() indention Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11  9:48 ` Gerd Hoffmann [this message]
2024-04-11  9:48 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/loader: read complete kernel Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11  9:48 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/loader: expose unpatched kernel Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11  9:48 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/loader: add -shim option Gerd Hoffmann

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