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From: jeffxu@chromium.org
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	usama.anjum@collabora.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com,
	rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	deraadt@openbsd.org, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v10 5/5] selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:35:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240415163527.626541-6-jeffxu@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org>

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>

Sealing read-only of elf mapping so it can't be changed by mprotect.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile   |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 185 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
index 98eaa4590f11..0b9ab987601c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
@@ -48,3 +48,4 @@ va_high_addr_switch
 hugetlb_fault_after_madv
 hugetlb_madv_vs_map
 mseal_test
+seal_elf
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
index 95d10fe1b3c1..02392c426759 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += mrelease_test
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_test
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mseal_test
+TEST_GEN_FILES += seal_elf
 TEST_GEN_FILES += on-fault-limit
 TEST_GEN_FILES += pagemap_ioctl
 TEST_GEN_FILES += thuge-gen
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..61a2f1c94e02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * need those definition for manually build using gcc.
+ * gcc -I ../../../../usr/include   -DDEBUG -O3  -DDEBUG -O3 seal_elf.c -o seal_elf
+ */
+#define FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+		if (!(c)) {\
+			ksft_test_result_fail("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+			goto test_end;\
+		} \
+	} \
+	while (0)
+
+#define SKIP_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+		if (!(c)) {\
+			ksft_test_result_skip("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+			goto test_end;\
+		} \
+	} \
+	while (0)
+
+
+#define TEST_END_CHECK() {\
+		ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);\
+		return;\
+test_end:\
+		return;\
+}
+
+#ifndef u64
+#define u64 unsigned long long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * define sys_xyx to call syscall directly.
+ */
+static int sys_mseal(void *start, size_t len)
+{
+	int sret;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	sret = syscall(__NR_mseal, start, len, 0);
+	return sret;
+}
+
+static void *sys_mmap(void *addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+	unsigned long flags, unsigned long fd, unsigned long offset)
+{
+	void *sret;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	sret = (void *) syscall(__NR_mmap, addr, len, prot,
+		flags, fd, offset);
+	return sret;
+}
+
+inline int sys_mprotect(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	int sret;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	sret = syscall(__NR_mprotect, ptr, size, prot);
+	return sret;
+}
+
+static bool seal_support(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+	void *ptr;
+	unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+
+	ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+	if (ptr == (void *) -1)
+		return false;
+
+	ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+const char somestr[4096] = {"READONLY"};
+
+static void test_seal_elf(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+	FILE *maps;
+	char line[512];
+	int size = 0;
+	uintptr_t  addr_start, addr_end;
+	char prot[5];
+	char filename[256];
+	unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+	unsigned long long ptr = (unsigned long long) somestr;
+	char *somestr2 = (char *)somestr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Modify the protection of readonly somestr
+	 */
+	if (((unsigned long long)ptr % page_size) != 0)
+		ptr = (unsigned long long)ptr & ~(page_size - 1);
+
+	ksft_print_msg("somestr = %s\n", somestr);
+	ksft_print_msg("change protection to rw\n");
+	ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
+	FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+	*somestr2 = 'A';
+	ksft_print_msg("somestr is modified to: %s\n", somestr);
+	ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ);
+	FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+	maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(maps);
+
+	/*
+	 * apply sealing to elf binary
+	 */
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
+		if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx %4s %*x %*x:%*x %*u %255[^\n]",
+			&addr_start, &addr_end, &prot, &filename) == 4) {
+			if (strlen(filename)) {
+				/*
+				 * seal the mapping if read only.
+				 */
+				if (strstr(prot, "r-")) {
+					ret = sys_mseal((void *)addr_start, addr_end - addr_start);
+					FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+					ksft_print_msg("sealed: %lx-%lx %s %s\n",
+						addr_start, addr_end, prot, filename);
+					if ((uintptr_t) somestr >= addr_start &&
+						(uintptr_t) somestr <= addr_end)
+						ksft_print_msg("mapping for somestr found\n");
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	fclose(maps);
+
+	ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+	FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+	ksft_print_msg("somestr is sealed, mprotect is rejected\n");
+
+	TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	bool test_seal = seal_support();
+
+	ksft_print_header();
+	ksft_print_msg("pid=%d\n", getpid());
+
+	if (!test_seal)
+		ksft_exit_skip("sealing not supported, check CONFIG_64BIT\n");
+
+	ksft_set_plan(1);
+
+	test_seal_elf();
+
+	ksft_finished();
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-15 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-15 16:35 [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 1/5] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:12   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 18:21     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-15 19:06       ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 2/5] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-04-16 14:59   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 15:17     ` Jann Horn
2024-04-16 16:42     ` Theo de Raadt
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 3/5] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:32   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 20:27     ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-16  0:34       ` Kees Cook
2024-05-02 11:24   ` Ryan Roberts
2024-05-02 15:18     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-02 22:39     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-03  8:30       ` Ryan Roberts
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 4/5] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` jeffxu [this message]
2024-04-16 15:13 ` [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 19:40   ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-18 20:19     ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19  1:22       ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 14:57         ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 15:14           ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 16:54             ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 17:59         ` Pedro Falcato
2024-04-20  1:23           ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-14 17:46 ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 19:52   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-14 20:59   ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-05-14 21:28     ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-14 22:48       ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-14 23:01         ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 23:47           ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  2:58             ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15  3:36               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  4:14                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  6:14                   ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15  0:43         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  0:57           ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  1:20             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  1:47               ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  2:28                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  2:42                   ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  4:53                     ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-14 21:28   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-15 17:18     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-15 22:19       ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-16  0:59         ` Jeff Xu

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