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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com,
	binbin.wu@linux.intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 04/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to EPT shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 16:19:29 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240416201935.3525739-5-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240416201935.3525739-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>

From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

To make use of the same value of shadow_mmio_mask and shadow_present_mask
for TDX and VMX, add Suppress-VE bit to shadow_mmio_mask and
shadow_present_mask so that they can be common for both VMX and TDX.

TDX will require shadow_mmio_mask and shadow_present_mask to include
VMX_SUPPRESS_VE for shared GPA so that EPT violation is triggered for
shared GPA.  For VMX, VMX_SUPPRESS_VE doesn't matter for MMIO because the
spte value is defined so as to cause EPT misconfig.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-Id: <97cc616b3563cd8277be91aaeb3e14bce23c3649.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c    | 6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 4dba17363008..ac6da0a5f5e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -514,6 +514,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT    			(1ull << 6)
 #define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT			(1ull << 8)
 #define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT			(1ull << 9)
+#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT			(1ull << 63)
 #define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK                        (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 768aaeddf5fa..0a0e83859c27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -413,7 +413,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
 	shadow_dirty_mask	= has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
 	shadow_nx_mask		= 0ull;
 	shadow_x_mask		= VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
-	shadow_present_mask	= has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+	/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
+	shadow_present_mask	=
+		(has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
 	/*
 	 * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
 	 * memtype directly into the SPTEs.  Note, this mask is just the mask
@@ -430,7 +432,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
 	 * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
 	 */
 	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
-				   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
+				   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);
 
-- 
2.43.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-16 20:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-16 20:19 [PATCH v2 00/10] KVM: MMU changes for confidential computing Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] KVM, x86: add architectural support code for #VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 22:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] KVM: x86/mmu: Use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 23:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] KVM: x86/mmu: check for invalid async page faults involving private memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-19  7:35   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-04-19  7:38     ` Paolo Bonzini

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