All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	<dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>,
	<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>, <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 07:44:44 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240417074444.2834769-1-guozihua@huawei.com> (raw)

A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
 path_openat+0x571/0x1720
 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

(stack trace marked with ? is deleted)

Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry->action	|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c0556907c2e6..c0cf9b6a01f0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
 	 * lsm rules can change
 	 */
-	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!nentry)
 		return NULL;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e88b1b6c4adb..b7cfad1a2964 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3549,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!tmprule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
-- 
2.34.1


             reply	other threads:[~2024-04-17  7:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-17  7:44 GUO Zihua [this message]
2024-04-19 21:41 ` [PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section Stephen Smalley
2024-04-22  1:26   ` Guozihua (Scott)
2024-04-22 12:18     ` Stephen Smalley
2024-04-23  7:30       ` Guozihua (Scott)
2024-05-08  8:32   ` Roberto Sassu
2024-05-08 11:19     ` Mimi Zohar
2024-05-08 15:15     ` Stephen Smalley
2024-05-08 15:25       ` Stephen Smalley

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240417074444.2834769-1-guozihua@huawei.com \
    --to=guozihua@huawei.com \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.