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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
	Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 2/2] audit: moar filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 12:33:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <208a86c97cd93181ffd7db2e5f95da012ab41a48.1542149969.git.rgb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542149969.git.rgb@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542149969.git.rgb@redhat.com>

Like 42d5e37654e4 ("audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic")

Any user or remote filesystem could become unavailable and effectively
block on a forced unmount.

    -a always,exit -S umount2 -F key=umount2

Provide a method to ignore these user and remote filesystems to prevent
them from being impossible to unmount.

Extend the "AUDIT_FILTER_FS" filter that uses the field type
AUDIT_FSTYPE keying off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic
identifier to filter specific filesystems to cover audit_inode() to address
this blockage.

An example rule would look like:
    -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x517B -F key=ignore_smb
    -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x6969 -F key=ignore_nfs

Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing
processes that touch removable filesystems.

Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d39a7fbaf944..59d6d3fbc00e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1777,10 +1777,33 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	struct audit_names *n;
 	bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
+	int i;
 
 	if (!context->in_syscall)
 		return;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!list_empty(list)) {
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+			for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+				struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+
+				if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) {
+					if (audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
+					    f->op, f->val)) {
+						if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+							rcu_read_unlock();
+							return;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	if (!name)
 		goto out_alloc;
 
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-16 17:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-16 17:33 [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 0/2] audit: avoid umount hangs on missing mount Richard Guy Briggs
2018-11-16 17:33 ` [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 1/2] audit: avoid fcaps on MNT_FORCE Richard Guy Briggs
2018-11-19 12:47   ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-11-19 22:58     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2018-11-19 22:58       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2018-11-20  8:17       ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-11-20 15:48         ` Richard Guy Briggs
2018-11-20 17:31           ` Steve Grubb
2018-11-16 17:33 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2018-12-12 13:03 ` [RFC PATCH ghak100 V1 0/2] audit: avoid umount hangs on missing mount Paul Moore
2018-12-14 16:27   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2018-12-14 22:02     ` Paul Moore
2018-12-14 23:03       ` Richard Guy Briggs

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