From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3 Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 21:30:39 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <28477.1562362239@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) Hi Linus, Here's my fourth block of keyrings changes for the next merge window. They change the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: (1) Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. (2) Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed. David --- The following changes since commit a58946c158a040068e7c94dc1d58bbd273258068: keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism (2019-06-27 23:02:12 +0100) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git tags/keys-acl-20190703 for you to fetch changes up to 7a1ade847596dadc94b37e49f8c03f167fd71748: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION (2019-07-03 13:05:22 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Keyrings ACL ---------------------------------------------------------------- David Howells (2): keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 128 ++++++-- Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst | 9 +- certs/blacklist.c | 7 +- certs/system_keyring.c | 12 +- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 2 +- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 2 +- fs/afs/security.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 25 +- fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 28 +- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 +- fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +- fs/fscache/object-list.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 30 +- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +- include/linux/key.h | 121 +++---- include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 65 ++++ lib/digsig.c | 2 +- net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 2 +- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 12 +- net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | 15 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 19 +- net/wireless/reg.c | 6 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 31 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 13 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 +- .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 14 +- security/keys/compat.c | 2 + security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +- security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 2 +- security/keys/gc.c | 2 +- security/keys/internal.h | 16 +- security/keys/key.c | 29 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 104 ++++-- security/keys/keyring.c | 27 +- security/keys/permission.c | 361 +++++++++++++++++++-- security/keys/persistent.c | 27 +- security/keys/proc.c | 22 +- security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++-- security/keys/request_key.c | 34 +- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 15 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +- 46 files changed, 992 insertions(+), 325 deletions(-)
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3 Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 22:30:39 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <28477.1562362239@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) Hi Linus, Here's my fourth block of keyrings changes for the next merge window. They change the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: (1) Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. (2) Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed. David --- The following changes since commit a58946c158a040068e7c94dc1d58bbd273258068: keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism (2019-06-27 23:02:12 +0100) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git tags/keys-acl-20190703 for you to fetch changes up to 7a1ade847596dadc94b37e49f8c03f167fd71748: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION (2019-07-03 13:05:22 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Keyrings ACL ---------------------------------------------------------------- David Howells (2): keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 128 ++++++-- Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst | 9 +- certs/blacklist.c | 7 +- certs/system_keyring.c | 12 +- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 2 +- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 2 +- fs/afs/security.c | 2 +- fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 25 +- fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 28 +- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 +- fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +- fs/fscache/object-list.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 30 +- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +- include/linux/key.h | 121 +++---- include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 65 ++++ lib/digsig.c | 2 +- net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 2 +- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 12 +- net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | 15 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 19 +- net/wireless/reg.c | 6 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 31 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 13 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 +- .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 14 +- security/keys/compat.c | 2 + security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +- security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 2 +- security/keys/gc.c | 2 +- security/keys/internal.h | 16 +- security/keys/key.c | 29 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 104 ++++-- security/keys/keyring.c | 27 +- security/keys/permission.c | 361 +++++++++++++++++++-- security/keys/persistent.c | 27 +- security/keys/proc.c | 22 +- security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++-- security/keys/request_key.c | 34 +- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 15 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +- 46 files changed, 992 insertions(+), 325 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2019-07-05 21:30 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-07-05 21:30 David Howells [this message] 2019-07-05 21:30 ` [GIT PULL] Keys: Set 4 - Key ACLs for 5.3 David Howells 2019-07-09 3:15 ` pr-tracker-bot 2019-07-09 3:15 ` pr-tracker-bot 2019-07-10 18:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-07-10 18:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-07-10 19:46 ` Eric Biggers 2019-07-10 19:46 ` Eric Biggers 2019-07-10 20:15 ` Eric Biggers 2019-07-10 20:15 ` Eric Biggers 2019-07-11 1:59 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-07-11 1:59 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-07-11 3:07 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-07-11 3:07 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-08-16 13:36 ` David Howells 2019-08-16 13:36 ` David Howells 2019-08-21 14:20 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-08-21 14:20 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-08-21 15:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-08-21 15:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-08-21 19:22 ` David Howells 2019-08-21 19:22 ` David Howells
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