From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Subject: [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 13:00:39 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <3336bb02792d56c49d18e2f7a435fd194a4a22e4.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <cover.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> It's currently only used in the EFI code, which is safe AFAICT. Warn if anyone tries to use it on the normal kernel pgd. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 6a8026918bf6..e9b9c5cedbb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -1996,6 +1996,9 @@ out: void kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *root, unsigned long address, unsigned numpages) { + /* Unmapping kernel entries from init_mm's pgd is not allowed. */ + WARN_ON(root == init_mm.pgd); + unmap_pgd_range(root, address, address + (numpages << PAGE_SHIFT)); } -- 2.5.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 13:00:39 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <3336bb02792d56c49d18e2f7a435fd194a4a22e4.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <cover.1466192946.git.luto@kernel.org> It's currently only used in the EFI code, which is safe AFAICT. Warn if anyone tries to use it on the normal kernel pgd. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 6a8026918bf6..e9b9c5cedbb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -1996,6 +1996,9 @@ out: void kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *root, unsigned long address, unsigned numpages) { + /* Unmapping kernel entries from init_mm's pgd is not allowed. */ + WARN_ON(root == init_mm.pgd); + unmap_pgd_range(root, address, address + (numpages << PAGE_SHIFT)); } -- 2.5.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-17 20:01 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-06-17 20:00 [PATCH v2 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message] 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:30 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-06-17 20:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov 2016-06-17 20:30 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-06-18 10:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-18 10:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-18 10:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-18 10:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-06-18 10:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov 2016-06-18 10:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 13:16 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:16 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:16 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 20:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 13:02 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:02 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:02 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 16:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 16:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 16:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 16:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 20:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 20:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-06-17 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 13:36 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:36 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 13:36 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-20 16:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 16:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-20 16:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 8:46 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-21 8:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko 2016-06-21 8:46 ` Michal Hocko 2016-06-21 17:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-21 17:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-06-17 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
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