All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: consulting@bugseng.com,
	Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
	Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>,
	Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>
Subject: [XEN PATCH 5/7] xen/arm: traps: add ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() where needed
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 11:30:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <394b69b769f2dc2461d2ddb0c7e037f4794eb244.1702283415.git.nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1702283415.git.nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>

The branches of the switch after a call to 'do_unexpected_trap'
cannot return, but there is one path that may return, hence
only some clauses are marked with ASSERT_UNREACHABLE().

Signed-off-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
---
 xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
index 3784e8276ef6..e7c920b043d2 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
@@ -2152,7 +2152,7 @@ void do_trap_hyp_sync(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     case HSR_EC_SVE:
         /* An SVE exception is a bug somewhere in hypervisor code */
         do_unexpected_trap("SVE trap at EL2", regs);
-        break;
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
 #endif
     case HSR_EC_DATA_ABORT_CURR_EL:
     case HSR_EC_INSTR_ABORT_CURR_EL:
@@ -2171,13 +2171,13 @@ void do_trap_hyp_sync(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
             dump_hyp_walk(get_hfar(is_data));
 
         do_unexpected_trap(fault, regs);
-
-        break;
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
     }
     default:
         printk("Hypervisor Trap. HSR=%#"PRIregister" EC=0x%x IL=%x Syndrome=0x%"PRIx32"\n",
                hsr.bits, hsr.ec, hsr.len, hsr.iss);
         do_unexpected_trap("Hypervisor", regs);
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
     }
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-11 10:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-11 10:30 [XEN PATCH 0/7] address violations of MISRA C:2012 Rule 2.1 Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 1/7] xen/shutdown: address " Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  1:39   ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-12  9:45   ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-12  9:53     ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12 10:30       ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 2/7] x86/mm: " Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  1:42   ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-12  9:12     ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  9:53       ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-13 14:44         ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-14  7:57           ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-14  8:52             ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 3/7] xen/arm: " Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 12:29   ` Julien Grall
2023-12-11 13:06     ` Michal Orzel
2023-12-11 14:14       ` Julien Grall
2023-12-11 14:52         ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 4/7] xen/sched: " Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 13:30   ` George Dunlap
2023-12-12  1:43   ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` Nicola Vetrini [this message]
2023-12-11 12:32   ` [XEN PATCH 5/7] xen/arm: traps: add ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() where needed Julien Grall
2023-12-11 14:54     ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 15:59       ` Julien Grall
2023-12-11 16:05         ` Julien Grall
2023-12-11 17:36           ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  1:36             ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-12  9:23               ` Julien Grall
2023-12-12 15:49     ` Julien Grall
2023-12-13 14:02       ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-14  9:42         ` Julien Grall
2023-12-14 22:32           ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-15 11:03             ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-15 14:08               ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-15 18:18                 ` Julien Grall
2023-12-15 21:02               ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 6/7] x86/platform: removed break to address MISRA C:2012 Rule 2.1 Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  1:44   ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-12 10:13   ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-12 22:38     ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-13 10:43     ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-11 10:30 ` [XEN PATCH 7/7] x86/xstate: move BUILD_BUG_ON " Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12  1:46   ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-12-12 10:04   ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-12 10:07     ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-12 13:38       ` Nicola Vetrini
2023-12-12 14:01         ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-12 14:05           ` Nicola Vetrini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=394b69b769f2dc2461d2ddb0c7e037f4794eb244.1702283415.git.nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com \
    --to=nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com \
    --cc=Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com \
    --cc=bertrand.marquis@arm.com \
    --cc=consulting@bugseng.com \
    --cc=julien@xen.org \
    --cc=michal.orzel@amd.com \
    --cc=sstabellini@kernel.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.