From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>, Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>, Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 02/15] kasan: clarify HW_TAGS impact on TBI Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 18:52:39 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <3b4ea6875bb14d312092ad14ac55cb456c83c08e.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> --- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that -the accessed address is partially accessible. - -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). Boot parameters ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control particular KASAN features. @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. + +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't +support MTE (but supports TBI). + What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? -------------------------------------------- -- 2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>, Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 02/15] kasan: clarify HW_TAGS impact on TBI Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 18:52:39 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <3b4ea6875bb14d312092ad14ac55cb456c83c08e.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> --- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that -the accessed address is partially accessible. - -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). Boot parameters ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control particular KASAN features. @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. + +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't +support MTE (but supports TBI). + What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? -------------------------------------------- -- 2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-15 17:53 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-01-15 17:52 [PATCH v4 00/15] kasan: HW_TAGS tests support and fixes Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] kasan: prefix global functions with kasan_ Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message] 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] kasan: clarify HW_TAGS impact on TBI Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] kasan: clean up comments in tests Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] kasan: add macros to simplify checking test constraints Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] kasan: add match-all tag tests Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] kasan, arm64: allow using KUnit tests with HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] kasan: rename CONFIG_TEST_KASAN_MODULE Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] kasan: add compiler barriers to KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] kasan: adapt kmalloc_uaf2 test to HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] kasan: fix memory corruption in kasan_bitops_tags test Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] kasan: move _RET_IP_ to inline wrappers Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] kasan: fix bug detection via ksize for HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] kasan: add proper page allocator tests Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] kasan: add a test for kmem_cache_alloc/free_bulk Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] kasan: don't run tests when KASAN is not enabled Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov 2021-01-15 17:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
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