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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com,
	rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	serge@hallyn.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, bgregg@netflix.com,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:16:19 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <40b9755f-bcbd-c096-37f0-ab2f50393f06@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com>


Extend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option
to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations [1]. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/design.txt   |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h   |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c  |  1 +
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt
index 0453ba26cdbd..71755b3e1303 100644
--- a/tools/perf/design.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/design.txt
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for
 their own tasks.
 
 A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts
-all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
+all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
 
 The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
index 051dc590ceee..0f79fbf6638b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)
 #define CAP_SYSLOG	34
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index f4dea055b080..3a46325e3702 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
 		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
 		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
+		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
 		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
+		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
 		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
 		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
 				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 969ae560dad9..9981db0d8d09 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)
 bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level)
 {
 	return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+			perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) ||
 			perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com,
	rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	serge@hallyn.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	bgregg@netflix.com, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:16:19 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <40b9755f-bcbd-c096-37f0-ab2f50393f06@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com>


Extend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option
to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations [1]. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/design.txt   |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h   |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c  |  1 +
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt
index 0453ba26cdbd..71755b3e1303 100644
--- a/tools/perf/design.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/design.txt
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for
 their own tasks.
 
 A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts
-all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
+all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
 
 The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
index 051dc590ceee..0f79fbf6638b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)
 #define CAP_SYSLOG	34
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index f4dea055b080..3a46325e3702 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
 		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
 		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
+		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
 		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
+		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
 		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
 		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
 				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 969ae560dad9..9981db0d8d09 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)
 bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level)
 {
 	return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+			perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) ||
 			perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com,
	rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	serge@hallyn.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	bgregg@netflix.com, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:16:19 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <40b9755f-bcbd-c096-37f0-ab2f50393f06@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com>


Extend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option
to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations [1]. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/design.txt   |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h   |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c  |  1 +
 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt
index 0453ba26cdbd..71755b3e1303 100644
--- a/tools/perf/design.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/design.txt
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for
 their own tasks.
 
 A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts
-all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
+all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
 
 The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
index 051dc590ceee..0f79fbf6638b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)
 #define CAP_SYSLOG	34
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index f4dea055b080..3a46325e3702 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
 		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
 		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
+		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
 		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
+		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
 		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
 		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
 				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 969ae560dad9..9981db0d8d09 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)
 bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level)
 {
 	return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+			perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) ||
 			perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-16  7:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-16  7:00 [PATCH v2 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:00 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:00 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:00 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:14 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:14   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:14   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:14   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 14:04   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 14:04     ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16 14:04     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-16  7:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:15   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:15   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:15   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:12   ` Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:12     ` [Intel-gfx] " Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:12     ` Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:12     ` Lubashev, Igor
2019-12-16 16:33     ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:33       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:33       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 16:33       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 17:12     ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 17:12       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 17:12       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16 17:12       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:16 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2019-12-16  7:16   ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v2 3/7] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:16   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:17   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:18 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:18   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:18   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:19 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:19   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:19   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-16  7:28 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Patchwork

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all data and code used by this external index.