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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>,
	"Ian Jackson" <iwj@xenproject.org>
Subject: [PATCH 02/12] libxenguest: deal with log-dirty op stats overflow
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 15:18:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <46831816-a5f2-2eb4-bb91-aba345448feb@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <912fa390-f9e9-198a-9aee-39fdb9a28fcc@suse.com>

In send_memory_live() the precise value the dirty_count struct field
gets initialized to doesn't matter much (apart from the triggering of
the log message in send_dirty_pages(), see below), but it is important
that it not be zero on the first iteration (or else send_dirty_pages()
won't get called at all). Saturate the initializer value at the maximum
value the field can hold.

While there also initialize struct precopy_stats' respective field to a
more sane value: We don't really know how many dirty pages there are at
that point.

In suspend_and_send_dirty() and verify_frames() the local variables
don't need initializing at all, as they're only an output from the
hypercall which gets invoked first thing.

In send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_list() the local variable can be dropped
altogether: It's optional to xc_logdirty_control() and not used anywhere
else.

Note that in case the clipping actually takes effect, the "Bitmap
contained more entries than expected..." log message will trigger. This
being just an informational message, I don't think this is overly
concerning.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_restore.c
+++ b/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_restore.c
@@ -452,7 +452,6 @@ static int send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_lis
     unsigned int count, written;
     uint64_t i, *pfns = NULL;
     struct iovec *iov = NULL;
-    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats = { 0, ctx->restore.p2m_size };
     struct xc_sr_record rec = {
         .type = REC_TYPE_CHECKPOINT_DIRTY_PFN_LIST,
     };
@@ -462,7 +461,7 @@ static int send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_lis
     if ( xc_logdirty_control(
              xch, ctx->domid, XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN,
              HYPERCALL_BUFFER(dirty_bitmap), ctx->restore.p2m_size,
-             0, &stats) != ctx->restore.p2m_size )
+             0, NULL) != ctx->restore.p2m_size )
     {
         PERROR("Failed to retrieve logdirty bitmap");
         goto err;
--- a/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_save.c
+++ b/tools/libs/guest/xg_sr_save.c
@@ -500,7 +500,9 @@ static int simple_precopy_policy(struct
 static int send_memory_live(struct xc_sr_context *ctx)
 {
     xc_interface *xch = ctx->xch;
-    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats = { 0, ctx->save.p2m_size };
+    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats = {
+        .dirty_count = MIN(ctx->save.p2m_size, (typeof(stats.dirty_count))~0)
+    };
     char *progress_str = NULL;
     unsigned int x = 0;
     int rc;
@@ -519,7 +521,7 @@ static int send_memory_live(struct xc_sr
         goto out;
 
     ctx->save.stats = (struct precopy_stats){
-        .dirty_count = ctx->save.p2m_size,
+        .dirty_count = -1,
     };
     policy_stats = &ctx->save.stats;
 
@@ -643,7 +645,7 @@ static int colo_merge_secondary_dirty_bi
 static int suspend_and_send_dirty(struct xc_sr_context *ctx)
 {
     xc_interface *xch = ctx->xch;
-    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats = { 0, ctx->save.p2m_size };
+    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats;
     char *progress_str = NULL;
     int rc;
     DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_SHADOW(unsigned long, dirty_bitmap,
@@ -701,7 +703,7 @@ static int suspend_and_send_dirty(struct
 static int verify_frames(struct xc_sr_context *ctx)
 {
     xc_interface *xch = ctx->xch;
-    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats = { 0, ctx->save.p2m_size };
+    xc_shadow_op_stats_t stats;
     int rc;
     struct xc_sr_record rec = { .type = REC_TYPE_VERIFY };
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-25 13:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-25 13:15 [PATCH 00/12] x86: more or less log-dirty related improvements Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:17 ` [PATCH 01/12] libxc: split xc_logdirty_control() from xc_shadow_control() Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 14:51   ` Christian Lindig
2021-06-25 15:49   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  9:40     ` Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:18 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-06-25 16:36   ` [PATCH 02/12] libxenguest: deal with log-dirty op stats overflow Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  7:48     ` Jan Beulich
2021-06-28 11:10       ` Olaf Hering
2021-06-28 11:20         ` Jan Beulich
2021-06-28 11:30           ` Olaf Hering
2021-06-25 13:18 ` [PATCH 03/12] libxenguest: short-circuit "all-dirty" handling Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 17:02   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  8:26     ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-02 17:11       ` Ian Jackson
2021-06-25 13:19 ` [PATCH 04/12] libxenguest: avoid allocating unused deferred-pages bitmap Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 18:08   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  8:47     ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-02 17:17       ` Ian Jackson
2021-06-25 13:19 ` [PATCH 05/12] libxenguest: complete loops in xc_map_domain_meminfo() Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 18:30   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  8:53     ` Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:20 ` [PATCH 06/12] libxenguest: guard against overflow from too large p2m when checkpointing Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 19:00   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  9:05     ` Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:20 ` [PATCH 07/12] libxenguest: fix off-by-1 in colo-secondary-bitmap merging Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 19:06   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-25 13:21 ` [PATCH 08/12] x86/paging: deal with log-dirty stats overflow Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 19:09   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-25 13:21 ` [PATCH 09/12] x86/paging: supply more useful log-dirty page count Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:22 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86/mm: update log-dirty bitmap when manipulating P2M Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 13:22 ` [PATCH 11/12] x86/mm: pull a sanity check earlier in xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 19:10   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-25 13:24 ` [PATCH 12/12] SUPPORT.md: write down restriction of 32-bit tool stacks Jan Beulich
2021-06-25 19:45   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-06-28  9:22     ` Jan Beulich

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