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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Tim Deegan" <tim@xen.org>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 11/17] x86/shadow: polish shadow_write_entries()
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:08:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <57495f9e-4a03-0317-6985-d32a694194ef@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4f1975a9-bdd9-f556-9db5-eb6c428f258f@suse.com>

First of all, avoid the initial dummy write: Try to write the actual
new value instead, and start the loop from 1 if this was successful.
Further, drop safe_write_entry() and use write_atomic() instead. This
eliminates the need for the BUILD_BUG_ON() there at the same time.

Then
- use const and unsigned,
- drop a redundant NULL check,
- don't open-code PAGE_OFFSET() and IS_ALIGNED(),
- adjust comment style.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -746,50 +746,50 @@ l1e_propagate_from_guest(struct vcpu *v,
  * functions which ever write (non-zero) data onto a shadow page.
  */
 
-static inline void safe_write_entry(void *dst, void *src)
-/* Copy one PTE safely when processors might be running on the
- * destination pagetable.   This does *not* give safety against
- * concurrent writes (that's what the paging lock is for), just
- * stops the hardware picking up partially written entries. */
-{
-    volatile unsigned long *d = dst;
-    unsigned long *s = src;
-    ASSERT(!((unsigned long) d & (sizeof (shadow_l1e_t) - 1)));
-    /* In 64-bit, sizeof(pte) == sizeof(ulong) == 1 word,
-     * which will be an atomic write, since the entry is aligned. */
-    BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof (shadow_l1e_t) != sizeof (unsigned long));
-    *d = *s;
-}
-
-
 static inline void
-shadow_write_entries(void *d, void *s, int entries, mfn_t mfn)
-/* This function does the actual writes to shadow pages.
+shadow_write_entries(void *d, const void *s, unsigned int entries, mfn_t mfn)
+/*
+ * This function does the actual writes to shadow pages.
  * It must not be called directly, since it doesn't do the bookkeeping
- * that shadow_set_l*e() functions do. */
+ * that shadow_set_l*e() functions do.
+ *
+ * Copy PTEs safely when processors might be running on the
+ * destination pagetable.  This does *not* give safety against
+ * concurrent writes (that's what the paging lock is for), just
+ * stops the hardware picking up partially written entries.
+ */
 {
     shadow_l1e_t *dst = d;
-    shadow_l1e_t *src = s;
+    const shadow_l1e_t *src = s;
     void *map = NULL;
-    int i;
+    unsigned int i = 0;
 
-    /* Because we mirror access rights at all levels in the shadow, an
+    /*
+     * Because we mirror access rights at all levels in the shadow, an
      * l2 (or higher) entry with the RW bit cleared will leave us with
      * no write access through the linear map.
      * We detect that by writing to the shadow with put_unsafe() and
-     * using map_domain_page() to get a writeable mapping if we need to. */
-    if ( put_unsafe(*dst, dst) )
+     * using map_domain_page() to get a writeable mapping if we need to.
+     */
+    if ( put_unsafe(*src, dst) )
     {
         perfc_incr(shadow_linear_map_failed);
         map = map_domain_page(mfn);
-        dst = map + ((unsigned long)dst & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+        dst = map + PAGE_OFFSET(dst);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        ++src;
+        ++dst;
+        i = 1;
     }
 
+    ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst, sizeof(*dst)));
 
-    for ( i = 0; i < entries; i++ )
-        safe_write_entry(dst++, src++);
+    for ( ; i < entries; i++ )
+        write_atomic(&dst++->l1, src++->l1);
 
-    if ( map != NULL ) unmap_domain_page(map);
+    unmap_domain_page(map);
 }
 
 /* type is only used to distinguish grant map pages from ordinary RAM



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-14 15:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-14 15:01 [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] x86/shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 15:43   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:13     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 16:18       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:26         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:07           ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 13:15             ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 14:46               ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:57                 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:23                   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:55   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 15:14     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:27       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86: split __copy_{from,to}_user() " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:06   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 17:03     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:26   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-10 16:55     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11  8:11       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-11 11:28         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 10:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 12:48     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 13:02       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 13:15         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86/shadow: " Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 13/17] x86/shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 14/17] x86/shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 15/17] x86/shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:11   ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-22 16:31     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 20:02       ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-25 11:09         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 11:33         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 16/17] x86/shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:11 ` [PATCH 17/17] x86/shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:18 ` [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Tim Deegan

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