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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:40:47 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been
disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by
the BHI mitigation itself if needed).  In that case retpolines are fine.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 27d6d64eeec3..0755600d5d18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1538,20 +1538,25 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
 
+static bool __ro_after_init rrsba_disabled;
+
 /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
 static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
+	if (rrsba_disabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) {
+		rrsba_disabled = true;
+		return;
+	}
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
-		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-	}
+	x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+	update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	rrsba_disabled = true;
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
@@ -1652,9 +1657,11 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-	    !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
-		return;
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+		if (rrsba_disabled)
+			return;
+	}
 
 	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
 		return;
@@ -2809,8 +2816,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
-	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-		 !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11  5:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11  5:40 [PATCH 0/7] x86/bugs: BHI fixes / improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:21   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:22   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  7:32   ` [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:02   ` [PATCH 3/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:34     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:20   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 15:08     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:06   ` [PATCH 5/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:38     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:24       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12  0:15   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  3:57     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  4:17       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:20         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:36           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 20:24             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:27       ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 10:07       ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-12  6:28   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  6:37     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  7:48   ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:18     ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-17  5:35       ` Reinette Chatre
2024-04-11 15:24     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf

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