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From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Aymen Sghaier" <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Udit Agarwal" <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Jan Luebbe" <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
	"David Gstir" <david@sigma-star.at>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Franck LENORMAND" <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 18:48:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7b771da7b09a01c8b4da2ed21f05251ea797b2e8.1626885907.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.9fc9298fd9d63553491871d043a18affc2dbc8a8.1626885907.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>

The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users
the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources
may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key
material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel.

This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production
HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be duplicated
only to arrive at a possibly worse result.

Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random
into an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG
will be used instead.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>
Cc: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/keys/trusted-type.h               | 2 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops {
 	/* Unseal a key. */
 	int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
 
-	/* Get a randomized key. */
+	/* Optional: Get a randomized key. */
 	int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
 
 	/* Exit key interface. */
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index 569af9af8df0..d2b7626cde8b 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 			continue;
 
 		get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
-		if (trusted_kernel_rng)
+		if (trusted_kernel_rng || !get_random)
 			get_random = kernel_get_random;
 
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-21 16:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-21 16:48 [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-21 16:48 ` [PATCH 1/4] KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-22  6:17   ` Sumit Garg
2021-07-21 16:48 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
2021-07-22  6:31   ` [PATCH 2/4] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources " Sumit Garg
2021-08-09  7:52     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-09  9:56       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-10  5:24         ` Sumit Garg
2021-07-21 16:48 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-10 11:29   ` David Gstir
2021-08-11 10:22     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-11 10:43       ` David Gstir
2021-07-21 16:48 ` [PATCH 4/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-06 15:12 ` [PATCH 0/4] " Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-09  9:35   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-09 10:16     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-10 11:28       ` David Gstir
2021-08-20 16:25         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-20 15:39 ` Tim Harvey
2021-08-20 16:19   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-20 20:20     ` Tim Harvey
2021-08-20 20:36       ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-20 21:19         ` Tim Harvey
2021-08-23 13:29           ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-23 17:50             ` Tim Harvey
2021-08-24  7:33               ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-08-24 15:23                 ` Tim Harvey
2021-08-25  9:34                   ` Ahmad Fatoum

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