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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:40:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   | 15 ++++++++-------
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index b70b1d8bd8e6..3cf18e4a1d9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
    - System is protected by retpoline
  * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
    - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
- * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
    - System is protected by software clearing sequence
  * - BHI: Syscall hardening
    - Syscalls are hardened against BHI
- * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
+ * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
    - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
 
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
@@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line.
 		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
 
 		on
-			unconditionally enable.
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
 		off
-			unconditionally disable.
+			Disable the mitigation.
 		auto
-			enable if hardware mitigation
-			control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
-			enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
+			Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+			*don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
+			The system may be vulnerable.
 
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 70046a019d42..a029ad6c4963 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6069,11 +6070,12 @@
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable.
-			off  - unconditionally disable.
-			auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
-			       (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
-			       alternate mitigation in KVM.
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+			       *don't* enable the SW mitigation except
+			       for KVM.  The system may be vulnerable.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
-- 
2.44.0


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11  5:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11  5:40 [PATCH 0/7] x86/bugs: BHI fixes / improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-11  6:21   ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:22   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  7:32   ` [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:02   ` [PATCH 3/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:34     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:20   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 15:08     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:06   ` [PATCH 5/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:38     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:24       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12  0:15   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  3:57     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  4:17       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:20         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:36           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 20:24             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:27       ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 10:07       ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-12  6:28   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  6:37     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  7:48   ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:18     ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-17  5:35       ` Reinette Chatre
2024-04-11 15:24     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf

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