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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Tim Deegan" <tim@xen.org>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] x86/shadow: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe()
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:08:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <95f4b531-caf7-0f6b-0320-72912eac5569@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4f1975a9-bdd9-f556-9db5-eb6c428f258f@suse.com>

This is the slightly more direct way of getting at what we want, and
better in line with shadow_write_entries()'s use of put_unsafe().

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -2614,10 +2614,9 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
         {
             shadow_l2e_t sl2e;
             mfn_t gl1mfn;
-            if ( (copy_from_unsafe(&sl2e,
-                                   (sh_linear_l2_table(v)
-                                    + shadow_l2_linear_offset(va)),
-                                   sizeof(sl2e)) != 0)
+            if ( (get_unsafe(sl2e,
+                             (sh_linear_l2_table(v) +
+                              shadow_l2_linear_offset(va))) != 0)
                  || !(shadow_l2e_get_flags(sl2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT)
                  || !mfn_valid(gl1mfn = backpointer(mfn_to_page(
                                   shadow_l2e_get_mfn(sl2e))))
@@ -2633,10 +2632,9 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
 #endif /* SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC */
         /* The only reasons for reserved bits to be set in shadow entries
          * are the two "magic" shadow_l1e entries. */
-        if ( likely((copy_from_unsafe(&sl1e,
-                                      (sh_linear_l1_table(v)
-                                       + shadow_l1_linear_offset(va)),
-                                      sizeof(sl1e)) == 0)
+        if ( likely((get_unsafe(sl1e,
+                                (sh_linear_l1_table(v) +
+                                 shadow_l1_linear_offset(va))) == 0)
                     && sh_l1e_is_magic(sl1e)) )
         {
 
@@ -3311,9 +3309,9 @@ static bool sh_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, un
         /* This must still be a copy-from-unsafe because we don't have the
          * paging lock, and the higher-level shadows might disappear
          * under our feet. */
-        if ( copy_from_unsafe(&sl3e, (sh_linear_l3_table(v)
-                                      + shadow_l3_linear_offset(linear)),
-                              sizeof (sl3e)) != 0 )
+        if ( get_unsafe(sl3e,
+                        (sh_linear_l3_table(v) +
+                         shadow_l3_linear_offset(linear))) != 0 )
         {
             perfc_incr(shadow_invlpg_fault);
             return false;
@@ -3332,9 +3330,9 @@ static bool sh_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, un
 
     /* This must still be a copy-from-unsafe because we don't have the shadow
      * lock, and the higher-level shadows might disappear under our feet. */
-    if ( copy_from_unsafe(&sl2e,
-                          sh_linear_l2_table(v) + shadow_l2_linear_offset(linear),
-                          sizeof (sl2e)) != 0 )
+    if ( get_unsafe(sl2e,
+                    (sh_linear_l2_table(v) +
+                     shadow_l2_linear_offset(linear))) != 0 )
     {
         perfc_incr(shadow_invlpg_fault);
         return false;
@@ -3375,10 +3373,9 @@ static bool sh_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, un
              * have the paging lock last time we checked, and the
              * higher-level shadows might have disappeared under our
              * feet. */
-            if ( copy_from_unsafe(&sl2e,
-                                  sh_linear_l2_table(v)
-                                  + shadow_l2_linear_offset(linear),
-                                  sizeof (sl2e)) != 0 )
+            if ( get_unsafe(sl2e,
+                            (sh_linear_l2_table(v) +
+                             shadow_l2_linear_offset(linear))) != 0 )
             {
                 perfc_incr(shadow_invlpg_fault);
                 paging_unlock(d);



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-14 15:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-14 15:01 [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] x86/shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 15:43   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:13     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 16:18       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:26         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:07           ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 13:15             ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 14:46               ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:57                 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:23                   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:55   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 15:14     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:27       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86: split __copy_{from,to}_user() " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:06   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 17:03     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:26   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-10 16:55     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11  8:11       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-11 11:28         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 10:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 12:48     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 13:02       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 13:15         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/shadow: polish shadow_write_entries() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 13/17] x86/shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 14/17] x86/shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 15/17] x86/shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:11   ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-22 16:31     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 20:02       ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-25 11:09         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 11:33         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 16/17] x86/shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:11 ` [PATCH 17/17] x86/shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:18 ` [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Tim Deegan

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