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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.1
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 17:17:30 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRbDONFkYe5J2KtFSRdKcz5Z3vdJFuiZCi_EQiJHFaNtA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)

Hi Linus,

Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.  As far as I'm
concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special to me, but
each commit has a decent description so you can judge for yourself.
As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please merge for
v5.1.

Thanks,
-Paul

--
The following changes since commit bfeffd155283772bbe78c6a05dec7c0128ee500c:

 Linux 5.0-rc1 (2019-01-06 17:08:20 -0800)

are available in the Git repository at:

 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
   tags/selinux-pr-20190305

for you to fetch changes up to 45189a1998e00f6375ebd49d1e18161acddd73de:

 selinux: fix avc audit messages (2019-02-05 12:34:33 -0500)

----------------------------------------------------------------
selinux/stable-5.1 PR 20190305

----------------------------------------------------------------
Ondrej Mosnacek (6):
     selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
     selinux: do not override context on context mounts
     selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
     selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
     selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
     selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c

Stephen Smalley (3):
     selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
     selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
     selinux: fix avc audit messages

security/selinux/avc.c              | 199 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
security/selinux/hooks.c            |  58 ++++++++---
security/selinux/include/avc.h      |   6 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h |   3 +
security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  37 ++++++-
5 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

             reply	other threads:[~2019-03-05 22:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-05 22:17 Paul Moore [this message]
2019-03-07 20:55 ` [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.1 pr-tracker-bot

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