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From: "Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [v3 PATCH 2/31] crypto: algif_skcipher - Add support for final_chunksize
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 17:18:41 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <E1k0Jsn-0006Hw-QM@fornost.hmeau.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20200728071746.GA22352@gondor.apana.org.au

As it stands algif_skcipher assumes all algorithms support chaining.
This patch teaches it about the new final_chunksize attribute which
can be used to disable chaining on a given algorithm.  It can also
be used to support chaining on algorithms such as cts that cannot
otherwise do chaining.  For that case algif_skcipher will also now
set the request flag CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MORE when needed.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---

 crypto/algif_skcipher.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index a51ba22fef58f..1d50f042dd319 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -57,12 +57,15 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = pask->private;
 	unsigned int bs = crypto_skcipher_chunksize(tfm);
+	unsigned int rflags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	int fc = crypto_skcipher_final_chunksize(tfm);
+	unsigned int min = bs + (fc > 0 ? fc : 0);
 	struct af_alg_async_req *areq;
 	int err = 0;
 	size_t len = 0;
 
-	if (!ctx->init || (ctx->more && ctx->used < bs)) {
-		err = af_alg_wait_for_data(sk, flags, bs);
+	if (!ctx->init || (ctx->more && ctx->used < min)) {
+		err = af_alg_wait_for_data(sk, flags, min);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -78,13 +81,23 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	if (err)
 		goto free;
 
+	err = -EINVAL;
+
 	/*
 	 * If more buffers are to be expected to be processed, process only
-	 * full block size buffers.
+	 * full block size buffers and withhold data according to the final
+	 * chunk size.
 	 */
-	if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used)
+	if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used) {
+		if (fc < 0)
+			goto free;
+
+		len -= fc;
 		len -= len % bs;
 
+		rflags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MORE;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the
 	 * SG entries from the global TX SGL.
@@ -116,8 +129,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		areq->outlen = len;
 
 		skcipher_request_set_callback(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req,
-					      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
-					      af_alg_async_cb, areq);
+					      rflags, af_alg_async_cb, areq);
 		err = ctx->enc ?
 			crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req) :
 			crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req);
@@ -129,9 +141,9 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		sock_put(sk);
 	} else {
 		/* Synchronous operation */
+		rflags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG;
 		skcipher_request_set_callback(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req,
-					      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
-					      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+					      rflags,
 					      crypto_req_done, &ctx->wait);
 		err = crypto_wait_req(ctx->enc ?
 			crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req) :

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-28  7:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-28  7:17 [v3 PATCH 0/31] crypto: skcipher - Add support for no chaining and partial chaining Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 1/31] crypto: skcipher - Add final chunk size field for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 17:15   ` Eric Biggers
2020-07-28 17:22     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 17:26       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-28 17:30         ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 17:46           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-28 22:12             ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` Herbert Xu [this message]
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 3/31] crypto: cts - Add support " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 11:05   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-28 11:53     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 11:59       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-28 12:03         ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 12:08           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-28 12:19             ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 4/31] crypto: arm64/aes-glue - Add support for chaining CTS Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 5/31] crypto: nitrox " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 6/31] crypto: ccree " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 7/31] crypto: skcipher - Add alg reqsize field Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 8/31] crypto: skcipher - Initialise requests to zero Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 17:10   ` Eric Biggers
2020-07-29  3:38     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:18 ` [v3 PATCH 9/31] crypto: cryptd - Add support for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 10/31] crypto: chacha-generic " Herbert Xu
2020-08-10 15:20   ` Horia Geantă
2020-08-11  0:57     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 11/31] crypto: arm/chacha " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 12/31] crypto: arm64/chacha " Herbert Xu
2020-07-29  6:16   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-29  6:28     ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 13/31] crypto: mips/chacha " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 14/31] crypto: x86/chacha " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 15/31] crypto: inside-secure - Set final_chunksize on chacha Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 16/31] crypto: caam/qi2 " Herbert Xu
2020-08-10 15:24   ` Horia Geantă
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 17/31] crypto: ctr - Allow rfc3686 to be chained Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 18/31] crypto: crypto4xx - Remove rfc3686 implementation Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 19/31] crypto: caam - Remove rfc3686 implementations Herbert Xu
2020-08-10 16:47   ` Horia Geantă
2020-08-11  0:59     ` Herbert Xu
2020-08-11  7:32       ` Horia Geantă
2020-08-11  7:34         ` Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 20/31] crypto: nitrox - Set final_chunksize on rfc3686 Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 21/31] crypto: ccp - Remove rfc3686 implementation Herbert Xu
2020-08-06 19:16   ` John Allen
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 22/31] crypto: chelsio " Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 23/31] crypto: inside-secure - Set final_chunksize on rfc3686 Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 24/31] crypto: ixp4xx - Remove rfc3686 implementation Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 25/31] crypto: nx - Set final_chunksize on rfc3686 Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 26/31] crypto: essiv - Set final_chunksize Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 27/31] crypto: simd - Add support for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 28/31] crypto: arm64/essiv - Set final_chunksize Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 29/31] crypto: ccree - Set final_chunksize on essiv Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 30/31] crypto: kw - Set final_chunksize Herbert Xu
2020-07-28  7:19 ` [v3 PATCH 31/31] crypto: salsa20-generic - dd support for chaining Herbert Xu
2020-07-28 17:19 ` [v3 PATCH 0/31] crypto: skcipher - Add support for no chaining and partial chaining Eric Biggers
2020-07-29  3:40   ` Herbert Xu

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