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From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>,
	Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
	Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
	Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Brand <markbrand@google.com>,
	Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 13/17] khwasan: add hooks implementation
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 19:39:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda832d8c46a36017b11d33e8dae10b09132f411.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This commit adds KHWASAN specific hooks implementation and adjusts
common KASAN and KHWASAN ones.

1. When a new slab cache is created, KHWASAN rounds up the size of the
   objects in this cache to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (== 16).

2. On each kmalloc KHWASAN generates a random tag, sets the shadow memory,
   that corresponds to this object to this tag, and embeds this tag value
   into the top byte of the returned pointer.

3. On each kfree KHWASAN poisons the shadow memory with a random tag to
   allow detection of use-after-free bugs.

The rest of the logic of the hook implementation is very much similar to
the one provided by KASAN. KHWASAN saves allocation and free stack metadata
to the slab object the same was KASAN does this.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/common.c  | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/khwasan.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 656baa8984c7..1e96ca050c75 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
 
@@ -148,11 +151,20 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 
 void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, 0);
+	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
+
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
+	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
-		*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW))
+			*shadow = tag;
+		else
+			*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -200,8 +212,9 @@ void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark)
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
-	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
+		return;
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -235,6 +248,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 			slab_flags_t *flags)
 {
 	unsigned int orig_size = *size;
+	unsigned int redzone_size = 0;
 	int redzone_adjust;
 
 	/* Add alloc meta. */
@@ -242,20 +256,20 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
 
 	/* Add free meta. */
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+	    (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+	     cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
 		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
 		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
 	}
-	redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
-		(*size - cache->object_size);
 
+	redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+	redzone_adjust = redzone_size -	(*size - cache->object_size);
 	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
 		*size += redzone_adjust;
 
 	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-			max(*size, cache->object_size +
-					optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
+			max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
 
 	/*
 	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
@@ -268,6 +282,8 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	cache->align = round_up(cache->align, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+
 	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
 }
 
@@ -325,18 +341,41 @@ void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
 
 void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	object = kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW) && unlikely(cache->ctor)) {
+		/*
+		 * Cache constructor might use object's pointer value to
+		 * initialize some of its fields.
+		 */
+		cache->ctor(object);
+	}
+	return object;
+}
+
+static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
+{
+        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+                return shadow_byte < 0 ||
+			shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+        else
+                return tag != (u8)shadow_byte;
 }
 
 static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 			      unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
 {
 	s8 shadow_byte;
+	u8 tag;
+	void *tagged_object;
 	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
 
+	tag = get_tag(object);
+	tagged_object = object;
+	object = reset_tag(object);
+
 	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
 	    object)) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
@@ -345,20 +384,22 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		return false;
 
 	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
-	if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+	if (shadow_invalid(tag, shadow_byte)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-	if (!quarantine || unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
 		return false;
 
 	set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
-	return true;
+
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -371,6 +412,7 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 {
 	unsigned long redzone_start;
 	unsigned long redzone_end;
+	u8 tag;
 
 	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
 		quarantine_reduce();
@@ -383,14 +425,15 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
+	tag = random_tag();
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
 	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
 		set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 
-	return (void *)object;
+	return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
 
@@ -440,7 +483,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
 
 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
+		if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(page)) {
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -453,7 +496,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 
 void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
-	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
+	if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
 		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
 }
diff --git a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
index d34679b8f8c7..fd1725022794 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
@@ -88,15 +88,52 @@ void *khwasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
 void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
+	u8 tag;
+	u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow;
+	void *untagged_addr;
+
+	tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
+
+	/* Ignore accesses for pointers tagged with 0xff (native kernel
+	 * pointer tag) to suppress false positives caused by kmap.
+	 *
+	 * Some kernel code was written to account for archs that don't keep
+	 * high memory mapped all the time, but rather map and unmap particular
+	 * pages when needed. Instead of storing a pointer to the kernel memory,
+	 * this code saves the address of the page structure and offset within
+	 * that page for later use. Those pages are then mapped and unmapped
+	 * with kmap/kunmap when necessary and virt_to_page is used to get the
+	 * virtual address of the page. For arm64 (that keeps the high memory
+	 * mapped all the time), kmap is turned into a page_address call.
+
+	 * The issue is that with use of the page_address + virt_to_page
+	 * sequence the top byte value of the original pointer gets lost (gets
+	 * set to KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF).
+	 */
+	if (tag == KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
+		return;
+
+	untagged_addr = reset_tag((const void *)addr);
+	shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
+	shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1);
+
+	for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) {
+		if (*shadow != tag) {
+			kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
 	void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_load##size##_noabort);			\
 	void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_store##size##_noabort)
 
@@ -108,15 +145,18 @@ DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(16);
 
 void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_loadN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>,
	Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
	Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
	Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Brand <markbrand@google.com>,
	Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 13/17] khwasan: add hooks implementation
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 19:39:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda832d8c46a36017b11d33e8dae10b09132f411.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This commit adds KHWASAN specific hooks implementation and adjusts
common KASAN and KHWASAN ones.

1. When a new slab cache is created, KHWASAN rounds up the size of the
   objects in this cache to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (== 16).

2. On each kmalloc KHWASAN generates a random tag, sets the shadow memory,
   that corresponds to this object to this tag, and embeds this tag value
   into the top byte of the returned pointer.

3. On each kfree KHWASAN poisons the shadow memory with a random tag to
   allow detection of use-after-free bugs.

The rest of the logic of the hook implementation is very much similar to
the one provided by KASAN. KHWASAN saves allocation and free stack metadata
to the slab object the same was KASAN does this.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/common.c  | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/khwasan.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 656baa8984c7..1e96ca050c75 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
 
@@ -148,11 +151,20 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 
 void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, 0);
+	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
+
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
+	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
-		*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW))
+			*shadow = tag;
+		else
+			*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -200,8 +212,9 @@ void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark)
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
-	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
+		return;
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -235,6 +248,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 			slab_flags_t *flags)
 {
 	unsigned int orig_size = *size;
+	unsigned int redzone_size = 0;
 	int redzone_adjust;
 
 	/* Add alloc meta. */
@@ -242,20 +256,20 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
 
 	/* Add free meta. */
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+	    (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+	     cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
 		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
 		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
 	}
-	redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
-		(*size - cache->object_size);
 
+	redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+	redzone_adjust = redzone_size -	(*size - cache->object_size);
 	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
 		*size += redzone_adjust;
 
 	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-			max(*size, cache->object_size +
-					optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
+			max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
 
 	/*
 	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
@@ -268,6 +282,8 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	cache->align = round_up(cache->align, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+
 	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
 }
 
@@ -325,18 +341,41 @@ void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
 
 void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	object = kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW) && unlikely(cache->ctor)) {
+		/*
+		 * Cache constructor might use object's pointer value to
+		 * initialize some of its fields.
+		 */
+		cache->ctor(object);
+	}
+	return object;
+}
+
+static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
+{
+        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+                return shadow_byte < 0 ||
+			shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+        else
+                return tag != (u8)shadow_byte;
 }
 
 static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 			      unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
 {
 	s8 shadow_byte;
+	u8 tag;
+	void *tagged_object;
 	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
 
+	tag = get_tag(object);
+	tagged_object = object;
+	object = reset_tag(object);
+
 	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
 	    object)) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
@@ -345,20 +384,22 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		return false;
 
 	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
-	if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+	if (shadow_invalid(tag, shadow_byte)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-	if (!quarantine || unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
 		return false;
 
 	set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
-	return true;
+
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -371,6 +412,7 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 {
 	unsigned long redzone_start;
 	unsigned long redzone_end;
+	u8 tag;
 
 	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
 		quarantine_reduce();
@@ -383,14 +425,15 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
+	tag = random_tag();
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
 	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
 		set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 
-	return (void *)object;
+	return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
 
@@ -440,7 +483,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
 
 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
+		if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(page)) {
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -453,7 +496,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 
 void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
-	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
+	if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
 		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
 }
diff --git a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
index d34679b8f8c7..fd1725022794 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
@@ -88,15 +88,52 @@ void *khwasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
 void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
+	u8 tag;
+	u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow;
+	void *untagged_addr;
+
+	tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
+
+	/* Ignore accesses for pointers tagged with 0xff (native kernel
+	 * pointer tag) to suppress false positives caused by kmap.
+	 *
+	 * Some kernel code was written to account for archs that don't keep
+	 * high memory mapped all the time, but rather map and unmap particular
+	 * pages when needed. Instead of storing a pointer to the kernel memory,
+	 * this code saves the address of the page structure and offset within
+	 * that page for later use. Those pages are then mapped and unmapped
+	 * with kmap/kunmap when necessary and virt_to_page is used to get the
+	 * virtual address of the page. For arm64 (that keeps the high memory
+	 * mapped all the time), kmap is turned into a page_address call.
+
+	 * The issue is that with use of the page_address + virt_to_page
+	 * sequence the top byte value of the original pointer gets lost (gets
+	 * set to KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF).
+	 */
+	if (tag == KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
+		return;
+
+	untagged_addr = reset_tag((const void *)addr);
+	shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
+	shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1);
+
+	for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) {
+		if (*shadow != tag) {
+			kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
 	void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_load##size##_noabort);			\
 	void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_store##size##_noabort)
 
@@ -108,15 +145,18 @@ DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(16);
 
 void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_loadN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: andreyknvl@google.com (Andrey Konovalov)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 13/17] khwasan: add hooks implementation
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 19:39:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda832d8c46a36017b11d33e8dae10b09132f411.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This commit adds KHWASAN specific hooks implementation and adjusts
common KASAN and KHWASAN ones.

1. When a new slab cache is created, KHWASAN rounds up the size of the
   objects in this cache to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (== 16).

2. On each kmalloc KHWASAN generates a random tag, sets the shadow memory,
   that corresponds to this object to this tag, and embeds this tag value
   into the top byte of the returned pointer.

3. On each kfree KHWASAN poisons the shadow memory with a random tag to
   allow detection of use-after-free bugs.

The rest of the logic of the hook implementation is very much similar to
the one provided by KASAN. KHWASAN saves allocation and free stack metadata
to the slab object the same was KASAN does this.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/common.c  | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/khwasan.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 656baa8984c7..1e96ca050c75 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
 
@@ -148,11 +151,20 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 
 void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, 0);
+	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
+
+	/* Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address */
+	address = reset_tag(address);
+
+	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
-		*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW))
+			*shadow = tag;
+		else
+			*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -200,8 +212,9 @@ void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark)
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
-	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
+		return;
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -235,6 +248,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 			slab_flags_t *flags)
 {
 	unsigned int orig_size = *size;
+	unsigned int redzone_size = 0;
 	int redzone_adjust;
 
 	/* Add alloc meta. */
@@ -242,20 +256,20 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
 
 	/* Add free meta. */
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
+	    (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+	     cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta))) {
 		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
 		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
 	}
-	redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
-		(*size - cache->object_size);
 
+	redzone_size = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+	redzone_adjust = redzone_size -	(*size - cache->object_size);
 	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
 		*size += redzone_adjust;
 
 	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-			max(*size, cache->object_size +
-					optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
+			max(*size, cache->object_size + redzone_size));
 
 	/*
 	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
@@ -268,6 +282,8 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	cache->align = round_up(cache->align, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+
 	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
 }
 
@@ -325,18 +341,41 @@ void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
 
 void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	object = kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW) && unlikely(cache->ctor)) {
+		/*
+		 * Cache constructor might use object's pointer value to
+		 * initialize some of its fields.
+		 */
+		cache->ctor(object);
+	}
+	return object;
+}
+
+static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
+{
+        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+                return shadow_byte < 0 ||
+			shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+        else
+                return tag != (u8)shadow_byte;
 }
 
 static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 			      unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
 {
 	s8 shadow_byte;
+	u8 tag;
+	void *tagged_object;
 	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
 
+	tag = get_tag(object);
+	tagged_object = object;
+	object = reset_tag(object);
+
 	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
 	    object)) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
@@ -345,20 +384,22 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		return false;
 
 	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
-	if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+	if (shadow_invalid(tag, shadow_byte)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
 		return true;
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
-	if (!quarantine || unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
+			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
 		return false;
 
 	set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
-	return true;
+
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
 }
 
 bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
@@ -371,6 +412,7 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 {
 	unsigned long redzone_start;
 	unsigned long redzone_end;
+	u8 tag;
 
 	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
 		quarantine_reduce();
@@ -383,14 +425,15 @@ void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
+	tag = random_tag();
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
 	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
 		set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
 
-	return (void *)object;
+	return set_tag(object, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
 
@@ -440,7 +483,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
 
 	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
+		if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(page)) {
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -453,7 +496,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 
 void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 {
-	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
+	if (reset_tag(ptr) != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
 		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
 }
diff --git a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
index d34679b8f8c7..fd1725022794 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/khwasan.c
@@ -88,15 +88,52 @@ void *khwasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
 void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
+	u8 tag;
+	u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow;
+	void *untagged_addr;
+
+	tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
+
+	/* Ignore accesses for pointers tagged with 0xff (native kernel
+	 * pointer tag) to suppress false positives caused by kmap.
+	 *
+	 * Some kernel code was written to account for archs that don't keep
+	 * high memory mapped all the time, but rather map and unmap particular
+	 * pages when needed. Instead of storing a pointer to the kernel memory,
+	 * this code saves the address of the page structure and offset within
+	 * that page for later use. Those pages are then mapped and unmapped
+	 * with kmap/kunmap when necessary and virt_to_page is used to get the
+	 * virtual address of the page. For arm64 (that keeps the high memory
+	 * mapped all the time), kmap is turned into a page_address call.
+
+	 * The issue is that with use of the page_address + virt_to_page
+	 * sequence the top byte value of the original pointer gets lost (gets
+	 * set to KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF).
+	 */
+	if (tag == KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
+		return;
+
+	untagged_addr = reset_tag((const void *)addr);
+	shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
+	shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1);
+
+	for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) {
+		if (*shadow != tag) {
+			kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
 	void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_load##size##_noabort);			\
 	void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr)		\
 	{								\
+		check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);	\
 	}								\
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_store##size##_noabort)
 
@@ -108,15 +145,18 @@ DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(16);
 
 void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_loadN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
+	check_memory_region(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-06-20 17:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-20 17:39 [PATCH v3 00/17] khwasan: kernel hardware assisted address sanitizer Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 01/17] khwasan, mm: change kasan hooks signatures Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 20:36   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-20 20:36     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-20 20:36     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-20 20:36     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-21 12:40     ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-21 12:40       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-21 12:40       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-21 12:40       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 03/17] khwasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_HW Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 04/17] khwasan, arm64: adjust shadow size for CONFIG_KASAN_HW Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 05/17] khwasan: initialize shadow to 0xff Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 06/17] khwasan, arm64: untag virt address in __kimg_to_phys and _virt_addr_is_linear Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 07/17] khwasan, arm64: fix up fault handling logic Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 08/17] khwasan: add tag related helper functions Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 09/17] khwasan, arm64: enable top byte ignore for the kernel Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 10/17] khwasan, mm: perform untagged pointers comparison in krealloc Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 11/17] khwasan: split out kasan_report.c from report.c Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` [PATCH v3 12/17] khwasan: add bug reporting routines Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2018-06-20 17:39   ` [PATCH v3 13/17] khwasan: add hooks implementation Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:39   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40 ` [PATCH v3 14/17] khwasan, arm64: add brk handler for inline instrumentation Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40 ` [PATCH v3 15/17] khwasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40 ` [PATCH v3 16/17] khwasan: update kasan documentation Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40 ` [PATCH v3 17/17] kasan: add SPDX-License-Identifier mark to source files Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 17:40   ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:15   ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:15     ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:15     ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:15     ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:15     ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:41     ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:41       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:41       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:41       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:41       ` Andrey Konovalov
2018-06-20 19:43       ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:43         ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:43         ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:43         ` Fabio Estevam
2018-06-20 19:43         ` Fabio Estevam

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