From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>, "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>, "Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>, "Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Subject: [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 16:10:05 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME). Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption. The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 20 ++++++++++++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 9 +++++++ include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 5 ++++ 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index a105796..475e34f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -15,14 +15,22 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/init.h> + #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void); +void __init sme_enable(void); + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #define sme_me_mask 0UL +static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { } +static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { } + #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 46c3c73..1f0ddcc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/start_kernel.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/proto.h> @@ -45,9 +46,10 @@ static void __head *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr) return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr; } -void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) +unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) { unsigned long load_delta, *p; + unsigned long pgtable_flags; pgdval_t *pgd; p4dval_t *p4d; pudval_t *pud; @@ -68,6 +70,12 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) if (load_delta & ~PMD_PAGE_MASK) for (;;); + /* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */ + sme_enable(); + + /* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */ + load_delta += sme_get_me_mask(); + /* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */ pgd = fixup_pointer(&early_top_pgt, physaddr); @@ -94,28 +102,30 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) pud = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); pmd = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); + pgtable_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE + sme_get_me_mask(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { p4d = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD; - pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; + pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; i = (physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_P4D; - p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; - p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; + p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } else { i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD; - pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } i = (physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PUD; - pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; + pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; + pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask(); pmd_entry += physaddr; for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(_end - _text, PMD_SIZE); i++) { @@ -136,9 +146,30 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) pmd[i] += load_delta; } - /* Fixup phys_base */ + /* + * Fixup phys_base - remove the memory encryption mask to obtain + * the true physical address. + */ p = fixup_pointer(&phys_base, physaddr); - *p += load_delta; + *p += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask(); + + /* Encrypt the kernel (if SME is active) */ + sme_encrypt_kernel(); + + /* + * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a + * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3. + */ + return sme_get_me_mask(); +} + +unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void) +{ + /* + * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a + * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3. + */ + return sme_get_me_mask(); } /* Wipe all early page tables except for the kernel symbol map */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 6225550..ec5d5e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -73,12 +73,19 @@ startup_64: /* Sanitize CPU configuration */ call verify_cpu + /* + * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt + * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME + * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be + * programmed into CR3. + */ leaq _text(%rip), %rdi pushq %rsi call __startup_64 popq %rsi - movq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ + addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax jmp 1f ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* @@ -98,7 +105,16 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Sanitize CPU configuration */ call verify_cpu - movq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* + * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be + * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3. + */ + pushq %rsi + call __startup_secondary_64 + popq %rsi + + /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ + addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: /* Enable PAE mode, PGE and LA57 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index b99d469..3ac6f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/init.h> /* * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must @@ -19,3 +20,11 @@ */ unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask); + +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) +{ +} + +void __init sme_enable(void) +{ +} diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h index 59769f7..570f4fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ static inline bool sme_active(void) return !!sme_me_mask; } +static inline unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void) +{ + return sme_me_mask; +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */ -- 1.9.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>, "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>, "Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>, "Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Subject: [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 16:10:05 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME). Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption. The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 20 ++++++++++++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 9 +++++++ include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 5 ++++ 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index a105796..475e34f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -15,14 +15,22 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/init.h> + #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT extern unsigned long sme_me_mask; +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void); +void __init sme_enable(void); + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #define sme_me_mask 0UL +static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { } +static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { } + #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 46c3c73..1f0ddcc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/start_kernel.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/proto.h> @@ -45,9 +46,10 @@ static void __head *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr) return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr; } -void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) +unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) { unsigned long load_delta, *p; + unsigned long pgtable_flags; pgdval_t *pgd; p4dval_t *p4d; pudval_t *pud; @@ -68,6 +70,12 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) if (load_delta & ~PMD_PAGE_MASK) for (;;); + /* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */ + sme_enable(); + + /* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */ + load_delta += sme_get_me_mask(); + /* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */ pgd = fixup_pointer(&early_top_pgt, physaddr); @@ -94,28 +102,30 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) pud = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); pmd = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); + pgtable_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE + sme_get_me_mask(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { p4d = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr); i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD; - pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; + pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; i = (physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_P4D; - p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; - p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; + p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } else { i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD; - pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } i = (physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PUD; - pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE; - pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE; + pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; + pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; + pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask(); pmd_entry += physaddr; for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(_end - _text, PMD_SIZE); i++) { @@ -136,9 +146,30 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr) pmd[i] += load_delta; } - /* Fixup phys_base */ + /* + * Fixup phys_base - remove the memory encryption mask to obtain + * the true physical address. + */ p = fixup_pointer(&phys_base, physaddr); - *p += load_delta; + *p += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask(); + + /* Encrypt the kernel (if SME is active) */ + sme_encrypt_kernel(); + + /* + * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a + * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3. + */ + return sme_get_me_mask(); +} + +unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void) +{ + /* + * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a + * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3. + */ + return sme_get_me_mask(); } /* Wipe all early page tables except for the kernel symbol map */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 6225550..ec5d5e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -73,12 +73,19 @@ startup_64: /* Sanitize CPU configuration */ call verify_cpu + /* + * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt + * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME + * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be + * programmed into CR3. + */ leaq _text(%rip), %rdi pushq %rsi call __startup_64 popq %rsi - movq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ + addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax jmp 1f ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* @@ -98,7 +105,16 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Sanitize CPU configuration */ call verify_cpu - movq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* + * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be + * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3. + */ + pushq %rsi + call __startup_secondary_64 + popq %rsi + + /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ + addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: /* Enable PAE mode, PGE and LA57 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index b99d469..3ac6f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/init.h> /* * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must @@ -19,3 +20,11 @@ */ unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask); + +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) +{ +} + +void __init sme_enable(void) +{ +} diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h index 59769f7..570f4fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ static inline bool sme_active(void) return !!sme_me_mask; } +static inline unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void) +{ + return sme_me_mask; +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */ -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-17 21:24 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 163+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-07-17 21:09 [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:47 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/cpu/AMD: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:47 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:48 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap() " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:48 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/cpu/AMD: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:48 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/cpu/AMD: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:49 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:49 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky [this message] 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:50 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:50 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:50 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:51 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:51 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:51 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/mm: Add support for early encryption/decryption " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-10-25 17:34 ` Dave Hansen 2017-10-26 13:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-10-26 14:08 ` Dave Hansen 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:52 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:52 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:53 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:53 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:53 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:54 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:54 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot: Use memremap() to map the MPF and MPC data tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-20 9:23 ` [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure Ingo Molnar 2017-07-20 10:27 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Ingo Molnar 2017-11-03 15:12 ` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tomeu Vizoso 2017-11-03 15:12 ` Tomeu Vizoso 2017-11-03 15:12 ` Tomeu Vizoso 2017-11-03 15:31 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-11-03 15:31 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-11-03 15:31 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-11-06 7:13 ` Tomeu Vizoso 2017-11-06 7:13 ` Tomeu Vizoso 2017-11-06 7:13 ` Tomeu Vizoso 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:54 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:55 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:55 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:56 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:56 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:56 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/cpu/AMD: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:57 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:57 ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:57 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/realmode: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:57 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:58 ` [tip:x86/mm] kvm/x86/svm: " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:58 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:58 ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:58 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:58 ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:59 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 10:59 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 11:00 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 11:00 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 9:36 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-18 9:36 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-18 9:36 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-18 13:56 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 13:56 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 13:56 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 11:00 ` [tip:x86/mm] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackprotector " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 18:27 ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky 2017-07-17 21:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 11:01 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 18:28 ` tip-bot for Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 12:03 ` [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Thomas Gleixner 2017-07-18 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-07-18 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-07-18 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-07-18 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-18 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
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