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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:50:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f5232d1d-cf7b-3863-1b3e-548230961efd@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d7cec72d-cc3c-381b-38cd-20e7242bfda8@linux.intel.com>


Implement selinux sysfs check to see the system is in enforcing
mode and print warning message with pointer to check audit logs.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/util/cloexec.c |  4 ++--
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c   | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
index a12872f2856a..9c8ec816261b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY,
+	WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
 		  "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n",
 		  err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
 
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
 	if (fd >= 0)
 		close(fd);
 
-	if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY,
+	if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
 		      "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n",
 		      err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))))
 		return -1;
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index 9fa92649adb4..bf437c059c2b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2514,32 +2514,41 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 			      int err, char *msg, size_t size)
 {
 	char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
-	int printed = 0;
+	int printed = 0, enforced = 0;
 
 	switch (err) {
 	case EPERM:
 	case EACCES:
+		printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+			"Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n");
+
+		if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) {
+			if (enforced) {
+				printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+					"Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance\n"
+					"monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for\n"
+					"more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n");
+			}
+		}
+
 		if (err == EPERM)
-			printed = scnprintf(msg, size,
+			printed += scnprintf(msg, size,
 				"No permission to enable %s event.\n\n",
 				perf_evsel__name(evsel));
 
 		return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
-		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
-		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
-		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
-		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
+		 "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n"
+		 "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n"
+		 "without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.\n"
+		 "perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
-		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
-		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
-				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
-				 perf_event_paranoid());
+		 ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n"
+		 "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n"
+		 "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)",
+		 perf_event_paranoid());
 	case ENOENT:
 		return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.",
 				 perf_evsel__name(evsel));
-- 
2.24.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-24  6:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-24  6:45 [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-04-24  6:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed Alexey Budankov
2020-04-24  6:50 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-04-24  6:51 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues Alexey Budankov
2020-04-30  7:06 [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-04-30  7:15 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: " Alexey Budankov
2020-05-18 15:58   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-05-18 16:43     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-05-19  7:34       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-05-19 18:10         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

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