From: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
To: russell@coker.com.au,
"selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org"
<selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: strict patch
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 2020 10:04:43 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <041061fb-7256-d549-a9a4-1e1e2f2adb38@ieee.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687678.FLogphAbyu@xev>
On 2/11/20 9:43 PM, Russell Coker wrote:
> The attached patch has a bunch of minor changes which are mostly needed in a
> "strict" configuration when running with systemd.
>
> It also removes the systemd_analyze_t domain which doesn't provide any
> benefit. This patch is against the git refpolicy from 3 days ago and I think
> it's ready for merging.
Please inline the patch and add signed-off-by.
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
[...]
> @@ -110,11 +112,15 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
>
> libs_exec_ld_so($1_t)
>
> + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
> +
> miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
> miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1_t)
>
> sysnet_read_config($1_t)
>
> + userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets($1_t)
> +
> # kdeinit wants systemd status
> init_get_system_status($1_t)
>
I would be ok with these in one of the other templates, but not the base
template.
> @@ -861,6 +867,10 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + udev_read_pid_files($1_t)
> + ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> usernetctl_run($1_t, $1_r)
> ')
>
Why?
> @@ -1208,6 +1218,15 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template',
>
> optional_policy(`
> systemd_dbus_chat_logind($1_t)
> + systemd_use_logind_fds($1_t)
> + systemd_dbus_chat_hostnamed($1_t)
> + systemd_write_inherited_logind_inhibit_pipes($1_t)
What features are these needed for?
> + # kwalletd5 inherits a socket from init
> + init_rw_inherited_stream_socket($1_t)
> + init_use_fds($1_t)
> + # for polkit-kde-auth
> + init_read_state($1_t)
> ')
> ')
>
> @@ -3519,6 +3538,25 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_runti
> ')
>
> ########################################
> +## <summary>
> +## write user runtime socket files
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`userdom_write_all_user_runtime_named_sockets',`
> + gen_require(`
> + attribute user_runtime_content_type;
> + ')
> +
> + allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:dir list_dir_perms;
> + allow $1 user_runtime_content_type:sock_file write;
Which processes is this related to?
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> ## <summary>
> ## Create objects in the pid directory
> ## with an automatic type transition to
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ selinux_read_policy(sysadm_t)
> userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t)
> userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t)
>
> +# for systemd-analyze
> +files_get_etc_unit_status(sysadm_t)
> +
> ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',`
> optional_policy(`
> init_run_daemon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
> @@ -1107,6 +1110,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + systemd_dbus_chat_logind(sysadm_t)
> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
> tboot_run_txtstat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
> ')
>
> @@ -1174,6 +1181,7 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sysadm_t)
> usbmodules_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',`
> xserver_xsession_entry_type($2)
> xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2)
> xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2)
> + xserver_use_user_fonts($2)
> # certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
> xserver_read_xdm_pid($2)
> # gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
> @@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
> gen_require(`
> type iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t, xauth_home_t;
> type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t;
> - type mesa_shader_cache_t;
> + type mesa_shader_cache_t, xdm_t;
> ')
>
> xserver_restricted_role($1, $2)
> @@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ interface(`xserver_role',`
>
> xserver_read_xkb_libs($2)
>
> + allow $2 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket accept;
> +
> optional_policy(`
> xdg_manage_all_cache($2)
> xdg_relabel_all_cache($2)
> @@ -1251,6 +1254,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',`
> allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> read_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
> read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
> + allow $1 xkb_var_lib_t:file map;
> ')
>
> ########################################
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/dbus.if
> @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
>
> allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
> allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
> + allow $1_dbusd_t $3:dbus send_msg;
> allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use;
>
> allow $3 system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
> @@ -99,9 +100,14 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
>
> allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill;
>
> + allow $1_dbusd_t self:process getcap;
> +
> corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
> corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3)
>
> + dev_read_sysfs($1_dbusd_t)
> + xdg_read_data_files($1_dbusd_t)
This xdg access needs to be optional.
> +
> auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t)
>
> ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
> @@ -109,6 +115,11 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + init_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t)
> + dbus_system_bus_client($1_dbusd_t)
> + ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> systemd_read_logind_pids($1_dbusd_t)
> ')
> ')
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> @@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
> xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
> xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
> xserver_sigchld_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)
> + xserver_write_inherited_xsession_log($1_ssh_agent_t)
> ')
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te
> @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type;
> #
> # bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories.
> #
> -type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t };
> +type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t systemd_analyze_exec_t };
> corecmd_executable_file(bin_t)
> dev_associate(bin_t) #For /dev/MAKEDEV
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
> @@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ type systemd_activate_t;
> type systemd_activate_exec_t;
> init_system_domain(systemd_activate_t, systemd_activate_exec_t)
>
> -type systemd_analyze_t;
> -type systemd_analyze_exec_t;
> -init_daemon_domain(systemd_analyze_t, systemd_analyze_exec_t)
> -
> type systemd_backlight_t;
> type systemd_backlight_exec_t;
> init_system_domain(systemd_backlight_t, systemd_backlight_exec_t)
> @@ -1168,6 +1164,7 @@ tunable_policy(`systemd_tmpfiles_manage_
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + dbus_manage_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> dbus_read_lib_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> dbus_relabel_lib_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t)
> ')
--
Chris PeBenito
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-16 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-12 2:43 strict patch Russell Coker
2020-02-16 15:04 ` Chris PeBenito [this message]
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