From: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
To: "Sugar, David" <dsugar@tresys.com>,
"selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org"
<selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Denial of cryptsetup reading cracklib database
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 18:50:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <09d4632d-06f8-6ee7-1ebd-94e9977990bf@ieee.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190327015033.10907-1-dsugar@tresys.com>
On 3/26/19 9:50 PM, Sugar, David wrote:
> When setting up a LUKS encrypted partition, cryptsetup is reading
> the cracklib databases to ensure password strength. This is
> allowing the needed access.
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1553216939.261:2652): avc: denied { search } for pid=8107 comm="cryptsetup" name="cracklib" dev="dm-1" ino=6388736 scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:lvm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:crack_db_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
> type=AVC msg=audit(1553216980.909:2686): avc: denied { read } for pid=8125 comm="cryptsetup" name="pw_dict.pwd" dev="dm-1" ino=6388748 scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:lvm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:crack_db_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
> type=AVC msg=audit(1553216980.909:2686): avc: denied { open } for pid=8125 comm="cryptsetup" path="/usr/share/cracklib/pw_dict.pwd" dev="dm-1" ino=6388748 scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:lvm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:crack_db_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
> type=AVC msg=audit(1553216980.909:2687): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=8125 comm="cryptsetup" path="/usr/share/cracklib/pw_dict.pwi" dev="dm-1" ino=6388749 scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:lvm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:crack_db_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Sugar <dsugar@tresys.com>
> ---
> policy/modules/system/lvm.te | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> index ba64c39d..bb71e7b9 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> @@ -375,6 +375,10 @@ optional_policy(`
> udev_read_pid_files(lvm_t)
> ')
>
> +optional_policy(`
> + usermanage_read_crack_db(lvm_t)
> +')
> +
> optional_policy(`
> virt_manage_images(lvm_t)
> ')
Merged.
--
Chris PeBenito
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-27 22:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-27 1:50 [PATCH] Denial of cryptsetup reading cracklib database Sugar, David
2019-03-27 22:50 ` Chris PeBenito [this message]
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