From: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@ieee.org>
To: russell@coker.com.au,
"selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org"
<selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: memlockd
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 2020 10:30:13 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <109b4ae6-a8b4-7bc8-8a20-8edfc838ac2f@ieee.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1920940.Lkz1Kncxd7@xev>
On 2/11/20 10:34 PM, Russell Coker wrote:
> The attach patch adds policy for memlockd, this is a daemon that locks
> important programs and config files into RAM so that if the system is paging
> heavily the sysadmin still has a good chance of being able to login to
> diagnose problems.
Please inline patch and add signed-off-by.
> --- /dev/null
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/services/memlockd.te
> @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
> +policy_module(memlockd, 1.0.0)
> +
> +########################################
> +#
> +# Declarations
> +#
> +
> +type memlockd_t;
> +type memlockd_exec_t;
> +init_daemon_domain(memlockd_t, memlockd_exec_t)
> +
> +########################################
> +#
> +# Local policy
> +#
> +
> +allow memlockd_t self:capability { setgid setuid ipc_lock };
> +allow memlockd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
> +allow memlockd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create connect };
> +
> +# cache /etc/shadow too
> +auth_read_shadow(memlockd_t)
> +auth_map_shadow(memlockd_t)
> +
> +sysnet_map_config(memlockd_t)
> +files_read_etc_files(memlockd_t)
> +
> +# for ldd
> +corecmd_exec_bin(memlockd_t)
> +corecmd_exec_shell(memlockd_t)
> +
> +libs_exec_ld_so(memlockd_t)
> +
> +corecmd_search_bin(memlockd_t)
> +files_map_etc_files(memlockd_t)
> +# has to exec for ldd
> +corecmd_exec_all_executables(memlockd_t)
I would guess this is doing mmap_exec but not execute_no_trans.
> +corecmd_read_all_executables(memlockd_t)
> +
> +logging_send_syslog_msg(memlockd_t)
> +
> +miscfiles_read_localization(memlockd_t)
> +
> Index: refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20200209.orig/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20200209/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if
> @@ -366,6 +366,31 @@ interface(`sysnet_read_config',`
>
> #######################################
> ## <summary>
> +## map network config files.
> +## </summary>
> +## <desc>
> +## <p>
> +## Allow the specified domain to mmap the
> +## general network configuration files.
> +## </p>
> +## </desc>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`sysnet_map_config',`
Please change name to sysnet_mmap_read_config().
> + gen_require(`
> + type net_conf_t;
> + ')
> +
> + files_search_etc($1)
> + allow $1 net_conf_t:file { read_file_perms map };
> +')
> +
--
Chris PeBenito
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-16 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-12 3:34 memlockd Russell Coker
2020-02-16 15:30 ` Chris PeBenito [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=109b4ae6-a8b4-7bc8-8a20-8edfc838ac2f@ieee.org \
--to=pebenito@ieee.org \
--cc=russell@coker.com.au \
--cc=selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).