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From: "Sugar, David" <dsugar@tresys.com>
To: "selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org"  <selinux-refpolicy@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Changes to support plymouth working in enforcing
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 19:39:31 +0000
Message-ID: <20190412193917.23886-3-dsugar@tresys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190412193917.23886-1-dsugar@tresys.com>

plymouth is started very early in the boot process.  Looks
like before the SELinux policy is loaded so plymouthd is
running as kernel_t rather than plymouthd_t.  Due to this
I needed to allow a few permissions on kernel_t to get
the system to boot.

Please note that in this case I have the harddisk encrypted
with LUKS so when plymouthd is started the harddisk is not
unlocked yet.  I don't know if the permissions are different
in the case when LUKS is not involved.

type=AVC msg=audit(1554917011.127:225): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=2585 comm="plymouthd" name="plymouth" dev="tmpfs" ino=18877 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1554917011.127:226): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=2585 comm="plymouthd" name="pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=18883 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1554917011.127:227): avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=2585 comm="plymouthd" name="pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=18883 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

type=AVC msg=audit(1554917011.116:224): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=2585 comm="plymouthd" name="boot-duration" dev="dm-16" ino=2097285 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

type=AVC msg=audit(1555069712.938:237): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=2554 comm="plymouthd" path="/dev/dri/card0" dev="devtmpfs" ino=12229 ioctlcmd=64b1 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:dri_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Signed-off-by: Dave Sugar <dsugar@tresys.com>
---
 policy/modules/kernel/devices.if     | 18 +++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te      |  5 +++-
 policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
index 78a95ce8..d1cdf933 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
@@ -1939,6 +1939,24 @@ interface(`dev_setattr_dri_dev',`
 	setattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, dri_device_t)
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	IOCLT the dri devices.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dev_ioctl_dri_dev',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type device_t, dri_device_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 dri_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
+')
+
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Read and write the dri devices.
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
index b9ae4079..d230a5a2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
@@ -397,9 +397,12 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
-	plymouthd_read_lib_files(kernel_t)
+	dev_ioctl_dri_dev(kernel_t)
+
+	plymouthd_delete_pid_files(kernel_t)
 	plymouthd_read_pid_files(kernel_t)
 	plymouthd_read_spool_files(kernel_t)
+	plymouthd_rw_lib_files(kernel_t)
 
 	term_use_ptmx(kernel_t)
 	term_use_unallocated_ttys(kernel_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if
index 04e0c734..3cc08b96 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if
+++ b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if
@@ -192,6 +192,25 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_lib_files',`
 	read_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t)
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Read and write plymouthd lib files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`plymouthd_rw_lib_files',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type plymouthd_var_lib_t;
+	')
+
+	files_search_var_lib($1)
+	rw_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t)
+')
+
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Create, read, write, and delete
@@ -232,6 +251,25 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_pid_files',`
 	allow $1 plymouthd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms;
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Delete the plymouthd pid files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`plymouthd_delete_pid_files',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type plymouthd_var_run_t;
+	')
+
+	files_search_pids($1)
+	delete_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_run_t, plymouthd_var_run_t)
+')
+
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	All of the rules required to
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-12 19:39 [PATCH 0/3] Resolve issues with plymouth " Sugar, David
2019-04-12 19:39 ` [PATCH 1/3] Allow xdm (lightdm) execute plymouth Sugar, David
2019-04-17  2:49   ` Sugar, David
2019-04-23 22:31   ` Chris PeBenito
2019-04-12 19:39 ` Sugar, David [this message]
2019-04-13  2:43   ` [PATCH 2/3] Changes to support plymouth working in enforcing Russell Coker
2019-04-13  3:23     ` Sugar, David
2019-04-13  4:24       ` Russell Coker
2019-04-13  7:51         ` Dominick Grift
2019-04-17  2:51           ` Sugar, David
2019-04-23 22:31   ` Chris PeBenito
2019-04-12 19:39 ` [PATCH 3/3] Some items that seem they can be dontaudited for plymouthd Sugar, David
2019-04-13  2:33   ` Russell Coker
2019-04-13  3:26     ` Sugar, David
2019-04-13  4:24       ` Russell Coker
2019-04-13  7:54         ` Dominick Grift
2019-04-17  2:53           ` Sugar, David
2019-04-14 17:49     ` Chris PeBenito

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