* [PATCH] services/ssh: Don't audit accesses from ssh_t to /dev/random
@ 2018-10-27 12:47 Luis Ressel
2018-10-27 19:10 ` Chris PeBenito
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Luis Ressel @ 2018-10-27 12:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux-refpolicy
OpenSSL 1.1 always opens both /dev/urandom and /dev/random, which
generates spurious denial messages for ssh_t, ssh_keygen_t and probably
various other domains too.
The code only uses /dev/random as a fallback and can cope with an open()
failure just fine, so I'm dontauditing the access. However, I don't have
strong feelings about this -- if someone would prefer to allow these
accesses instead, I'd be okay with that too.
---
policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
index 092fe422..4e37a264 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t)
corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t)
dev_read_urand(ssh_t)
+dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_t)
@@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_keygen_t)
dev_read_sysfs(ssh_keygen_t)
dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t)
+dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_keygen_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] services/ssh: Don't audit accesses from ssh_t to /dev/random
2018-10-27 12:47 [PATCH] services/ssh: Don't audit accesses from ssh_t to /dev/random Luis Ressel
@ 2018-10-27 19:10 ` Chris PeBenito
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Chris PeBenito @ 2018-10-27 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luis Ressel, selinux-refpolicy
On 10/27/2018 08:47 AM, Luis Ressel wrote:
> OpenSSL 1.1 always opens both /dev/urandom and /dev/random, which
> generates spurious denial messages for ssh_t, ssh_keygen_t and probably
> various other domains too.
>
> The code only uses /dev/random as a fallback and can cope with an open()
> failure just fine, so I'm dontauditing the access. However, I don't have
> strong feelings about this -- if someone would prefer to allow these
> accesses instead, I'd be okay with that too.
> ---
> policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> index 092fe422..4e37a264 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
> @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t)
> corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t)
>
> dev_read_urand(ssh_t)
> +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_t)
>
> fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t)
> fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_t)
> @@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_keygen_t)
>
> dev_read_sysfs(ssh_keygen_t)
> dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t)
> +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(ssh_keygen_t)
>
> term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t)
Merged.
--
Chris PeBenito
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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