* [PATCH] chromium
@ 2019-01-28 8:46 Russell Coker
2019-01-29 23:53 ` Chris PeBenito
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2019-01-28 8:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux-refpolicy
There are several nacl binaries that need labels.
Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.
Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was
submitted at the same time?
I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir
Allow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.
Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.
Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some
other shell script.
How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process
share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?
Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
/opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
/opt/google/chrome/google-chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
-/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
+/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
/opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
/opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
@@ -19,9 +19,14 @@
/opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
/opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
+ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+/usr/lib/chromium/chromium -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+', `
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+')
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
/usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
+ chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
cron_role(staff_r, staff_t)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
@@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
+ chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
')
optional_policy(`
+ chromium_role(user_r, user_t)
+ ')
+
+ optional_policy(`
cron_role(user_r, user_t)
')
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
# execmem for load in plugins
allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
+allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
+allow chromium_t self:file create;
allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -94,11 +96,14 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:shm
allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
-allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share };
+# for self:file create
+kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
+
# tmp has a wide class access (used for plugins)
manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t)
allow chromium_t chromium_tmp_t:file map;
@@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(chromium_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_t)
files_list_home(chromium_t)
files_search_home(chromium_t)
@@ -159,12 +165,17 @@ files_read_etc_files(chromium_t)
files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(chromium_t)
fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chromium_t)
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(chromium_t)
+fs_search_cgroup_dirs(chromium_t)
miscfiles_read_all_certs(chromium_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chromium_t)
+# for /run/udev/data/*
+udev_read_pid_files(chromium_t)
+
userdom_user_content_access_template(chromium, chromium_t)
userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(chromium_t)
# Debugging. Also on user_tty_device_t if X is started through "startx" for instance
@@ -172,12 +183,10 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t)
userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t)
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki")
-xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t)
-xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t)
-xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t)
xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
@@ -195,6 +204,8 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',`
tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
# Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version
+ kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chromium_t)
+ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
kernel_read_system_state(chromium_t)
# Debugging (sys/kernel/debug) and device information (sys/bus and sys/devices).
@@ -237,6 +248,13 @@ optional_policy(`
')
')
+optional_policy(`
+ apt_read_cache(chromium_t)
+ apt_read_db(chromium_t)
+ dpkg_exec(chromium_t)
+ dpkg_read_db(chromium_t)
+')
+
ifdef(`use_alsa',`
optional_policy(`
alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
@@ -309,23 +327,27 @@ allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:dir
allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
kernel_list_proc(chromium_sandbox_t)
domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(chromium_sandbox_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_sandbox_t)
userdom_use_user_ptys(chromium_sandbox_t)
chromium_domtrans(chromium_sandbox_t)
+domtrans_pattern(chromium_sandbox_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process share;
##########################################
#
# Chromium nacl helper local policy
#
-allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
domain_mmap_low_uncond(chromium_naclhelper_t)
@@ -338,3 +360,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf
kernel_dontaudit_read_kernel_sysctl(chromium_naclhelper_t)
kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(chromium_naclhelper_t)
')
+
+dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t)
+dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
===================================================================
--- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
+++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
@@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type proc_t;
+ ')
+ allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] chromium
2019-01-28 8:46 [PATCH] chromium Russell Coker
@ 2019-01-29 23:53 ` Chris PeBenito
2019-01-30 12:52 ` Russell Coker
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Chris PeBenito @ 2019-01-29 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell Coker, selinux-refpolicy
On 1/28/19 3:46 AM, Russell Coker wrote:
> There are several nacl binaries that need labels.
>
> Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.
>
> Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was
> submitted at the same time?
>
> I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
> type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
> type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)
> type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
> type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file
> type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir
>
> Allow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.
>
> Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.
>
> Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some
> other shell script.
>
> How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process
> share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?
>
> Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.
>
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
> /opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
> /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
> /opt/google/chrome/google-chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
> -/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
> +/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
> /opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
>
> /opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
> @@ -19,9 +19,14 @@
> /opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
> /opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
>
> +ifdef(`distro_debian',`
> +/usr/lib/chromium/chromium -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
> +/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
> +', `
> /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
> +')
> /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
> /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
> @@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t)
> + ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> cron_role(staff_r, staff_t)
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
> @@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
> + ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
> @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
> ')
>
> optional_policy(`
> + chromium_role(user_r, user_t)
> + ')
> +
> + optional_policy(`
> cron_role(user_r, user_t)
> ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
>
> # execmem for load in plugins
> allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
> +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
> +allow chromium_t self:file create;
I dropped this and the related proc_t associate. I would like to have a
better understanding what is happening. The domain type on
file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the /proc/pid
entries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The
fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.
> allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
> allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
> allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
> @@ -94,11 +96,14 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:shm
> allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
> allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
>
> -allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
> -allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
> +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
> +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
>
> allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share };
>
> +# for self:file create
> +kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
> +
> # tmp has a wide class access (used for plugins)
> manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t)
> allow chromium_t chromium_tmp_t:file map;
> @@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
> dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
>
> domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(chromium_t)
> +domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_t)
>
> files_list_home(chromium_t)
> files_search_home(chromium_t)
> @@ -159,12 +165,17 @@ files_read_etc_files(chromium_t)
> files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(chromium_t)
>
> fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chromium_t)
> +fs_getattr_tmpfs(chromium_t)
> +fs_search_cgroup_dirs(chromium_t)
>
> miscfiles_read_all_certs(chromium_t)
> miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_t)
>
> sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chromium_t)
>
> +# for /run/udev/data/*
> +udev_read_pid_files(chromium_t)
> +
> userdom_user_content_access_template(chromium, chromium_t)
> userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(chromium_t)
> # Debugging. Also on user_tty_device_t if X is started through "startx" for instance
> @@ -172,12 +183,10 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t)
> userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t)
> userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki")
>
> -xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
> -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
> -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
> +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific
cache/data/config if it is modifying them.
> xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t)
> -xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t)
> -xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t)
>
> xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
>
> @@ -195,6 +204,8 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',`
> tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
> kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
> # Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version
> + kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chromium_t)
> + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
> kernel_read_system_state(chromium_t)
>
> # Debugging (sys/kernel/debug) and device information (sys/bus and sys/devices).
> @@ -237,6 +248,13 @@ optional_policy(`
> ')
> ')
>
> +optional_policy(`
> + apt_read_cache(chromium_t)
> + apt_read_db(chromium_t)
> + dpkg_exec(chromium_t)
> + dpkg_read_db(chromium_t)
> +')
> +
> ifdef(`use_alsa',`
> optional_policy(`
> alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
> @@ -309,23 +327,27 @@ allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:dir
> allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
> allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:file rw_file_perms;
>
> -allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
> -allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
> +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
> +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
>
> kernel_list_proc(chromium_sandbox_t)
>
> domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(chromium_sandbox_t)
> +domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_sandbox_t)
>
> userdom_use_user_ptys(chromium_sandbox_t)
>
> chromium_domtrans(chromium_sandbox_t)
> +domtrans_pattern(chromium_sandbox_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
> +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process share;
>
> ##########################################
> #
> # Chromium nacl helper local policy
> #
>
> -allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
> +allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
> +allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
>
> domain_mmap_low_uncond(chromium_naclhelper_t)
>
> @@ -338,3 +360,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf
> kernel_dontaudit_read_kernel_sysctl(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> ')
> +
> +dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> +dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
> @@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
>
> ########################################
> ## <summary>
> +## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +## <summary>
> +## Domain allowed access.
> +## </summary>
> +## </param>
> +## <rolecap/>
> +#
> +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
> + gen_require(`
> + type proc_t;
> + ')
> + allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> ## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
> ## </summary>
> ## <param name="domain">
Otherwise merged.
--
Chris PeBenito
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] chromium
2019-01-29 23:53 ` Chris PeBenito
@ 2019-01-30 12:52 ` Russell Coker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2019-01-30 12:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris PeBenito; +Cc: selinux-refpolicy
On Wednesday, 30 January 2019 10:53:54 AM AEDT Chris PeBenito wrote:
> > I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
> > type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash
> > /usr/bin/google-chrome type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218)
> > : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c
> > a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158
> > pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test
> > egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome
> > exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC
> > msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for
> > pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63
> > scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0
> > tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=AVC
> > msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for
> > pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0
> > tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC
> > msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for
> > pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0
> > tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir
> >
> > Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> > ===================================================================
> > --- refpolicy-2.20180701.orig/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> > +++ refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
> > @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
> >
> > # execmem for load in plugins
> > allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit
> > setsched sigkill signal }; +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
> > +allow chromium_t self:file create;
>
> I dropped this and the related proc_t associate. I would like to have a
> better understanding what is happening. The domain type on
> file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the /proc/pid
> entries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The
> fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.
It seems easily repeatable by starting Chrome. I don't know why openat() is
triggering that. I'll leave this in the Debian tree and come back to it
later.
> > -xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
> > -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
> > -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
> > +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
> > +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
> > +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
>
> It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific
> cache/data/config if it is modifying them.
I guess. I'll leave that in the Debian tree, I don't have time to do more
about this at the moment.
--
My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2019-01-28 8:46 [PATCH] chromium Russell Coker
2019-01-29 23:53 ` Chris PeBenito
2019-01-30 12:52 ` Russell Coker
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