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* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes
@ 2019-02-02  9:09 Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02  9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
	selinux, paul, ddutile

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>

Hi,

This is second version of previously sent patch "IB/core: Don't register
MAD agents for LSM notifications", due to the fact that we found extra
things to fix during the review, I grouped that patch together with
other fixes in that area.

Thanks

Daniel Jurgens (4):
  IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security
  IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents
  IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct
  IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier

 drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h |  5 +++
 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c    |  1 +
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c  | 57 +++++++++++++++++------------
 include/rdma/ib_mad.h               |  5 +--
 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--
2.19.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security
  2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02  9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
	selinux, paul, ddutile

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

If the notifier runs after the security context is freed an access of
freed memory can occur.

Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 1efadbccf394..402449d4a888 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -727,9 +727,10 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
 	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
 		return;

-	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
 	if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
 		unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
+
+	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
 }

 int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
--
2.19.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents
  2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02  9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
	selinux, paul, ddutile

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

If the MAD agents isn't allowed to manage the subnet, or fails to
register for the LSM notifier, the security context is leaked. Free the
context in these cases.

Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 402449d4a888..7662e9347238 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -710,16 +710,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 						dev_name(&agent->device->dev),
 						agent->port_num);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto free_security;

 	agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change;
 	ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto free_security;

 	agent->smp_allowed = true;
 	agent->lsm_nb_reg = true;
 	return 0;
+
+free_security:
+	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
+	return ret;
 }

 void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
--
2.19.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct
  2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02  9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
	selinux, paul, ddutile

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

Move the security related fields above the u8s to eliminate a hole in
the struct.

pahole before:
struct ib_mad_agent {
...
u32                        hi_tid;               /*    48     4 */
u32                        flags;                /*    52     4 */
u8                         port_num;             /*    56     1 */
u8                         rmpp_version;         /*    57     1 */

/* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */

/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
void *                     security;             /*    64     8 */
bool                       smp_allowed;          /*    72     1 */
bool                       lsm_nb_reg;           /*    73     1 */

/* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */

struct notifier_block      lsm_nb;               /*    80    24 */

/* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */

/* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */
...
};

pahole after:
struct ib_mad_agent {
...
u32                        hi_tid;               /*    48     4 */
u32                        flags;                /*    52     4 */
void *                     security;             /*    56     8 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
struct notifier_block      lsm_nb;               /*    64    24 */

/* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */

u8                         port_num;             /*    88     1 */
u8                         rmpp_version;         /*    89     1 */
bool                       smp_allowed;          /*    90     1 */
bool                       lsm_nb_reg;           /*    91     1 */

/* size: 96, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */
...
};

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
index fdef558e3a2d..1c0b914f199d 100644
--- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
+++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
@@ -616,12 +616,12 @@ struct ib_mad_agent {
 	void			*context;
 	u32			hi_tid;
 	u32			flags;
+	void			*security;
+	struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
 	u8			port_num;
 	u8			rmpp_version;
-	void			*security;
 	bool			smp_allowed;
 	bool			lsm_nb_reg;
-	struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
 };

 /**
--
2.19.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier
  2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
  2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore
  2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02  9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
  Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
	selinux, paul, ddutile

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet
processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents
are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled.
Notifier chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With
large numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously
the CPUs spend too much time with interrupts disabled.

Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification,
maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this
registration already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write
mostly, so a normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents
must be checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down
per device.

Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of
similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings
when notified.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
CC: paul@paul-moore.com
CC: ddutile@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h |  5 +++
 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c    |  1 +
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c  | 50 ++++++++++++++++-------------
 include/rdma/ib_mad.h               |  3 +-
 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
index 616734313f0c..6fd3d3d06d18 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 				enum ib_qp_type qp_type);
 void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent);
 int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index);
+void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void);
 #else
 static inline void ib_security_destroy_port_pkey_list(struct ib_device *device)
 {
@@ -264,6 +265,10 @@ static inline int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
+{
+}
 #endif

 struct ib_device *ib_device_get_by_index(u32 ifindex);
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
index 238ec42778ef..8c1d8ffb09e2 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int ib_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
 		return NOTIFY_DONE;

 	schedule_work(&ib_policy_change_work);
+	ib_mad_agent_security_change();

 	return NOTIFY_OK;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 7662e9347238..a70d2ba312ed 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
 #include "core_priv.h"
 #include "mad_priv.h"

+static LIST_HEAD(mad_agent_list);
+/* Lock to protect mad_agent_list */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mad_agent_list_lock);
+
 static struct pkey_index_qp_list *get_pkey_idx_qp_list(struct ib_port_pkey *pp)
 {
 	struct pkey_index_qp_list *pkey = NULL;
@@ -676,19 +680,18 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
 	return security_ib_pkey_access(sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
 }

-static int ib_mad_agent_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb,
-					unsigned long event,
-					void *data)
+void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
 {
-	struct ib_mad_agent *ag = container_of(nb, struct ib_mad_agent, lsm_nb);
-
-	if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE)
-		return NOTIFY_DONE;
-
-	ag->smp_allowed = !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(
-		ag->security, dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num);
-
-	return NOTIFY_OK;
+	struct ib_mad_agent *ag;
+
+	spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ag,
+			    &mad_agent_list,
+			    mad_agent_sec_list)
+		WRITE_ONCE(ag->smp_allowed,
+			   !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(ag->security,
+				dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num));
+	spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
 }

 int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
@@ -699,6 +702,8 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
 		return 0;

+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
+
 	ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -706,22 +711,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 	if (qp_type != IB_QPT_SMI)
 		return 0;

+	spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
 	ret = security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(agent->security,
 						dev_name(&agent->device->dev),
 						agent->port_num);
 	if (ret)
 		goto free_security;

-	agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change;
-	ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
-	if (ret)
-		goto free_security;
-
-	agent->smp_allowed = true;
-	agent->lsm_nb_reg = true;
+	WRITE_ONCE(agent->smp_allowed, true);
+	list_add(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list, &mad_agent_list);
+	spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
 	return 0;

 free_security:
+	spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
 	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -731,8 +734,11 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
 	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
 		return;

-	if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
-		unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
+	if (agent->qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
+		spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
+		list_del(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
+		spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
+	}

 	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
 }
@@ -743,7 +749,7 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
 		return 0;

 	if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
-		if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
+		if (!READ_ONCE(map->agent.smp_allowed))
 			return -EACCES;
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
index 1c0b914f199d..79ba8219e7dc 100644
--- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
+++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
@@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ struct ib_mad_agent {
 	u32			hi_tid;
 	u32			flags;
 	void			*security;
-	struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
+	struct list_head	mad_agent_sec_list;
 	u8			port_num;
 	u8			rmpp_version;
 	bool			smp_allowed;
-	bool			lsm_nb_reg;
 };

 /**
--
2.19.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2019-02-06 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Leon Romanovsky
  Cc: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe, Leon Romanovsky,
	RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux,
	ddutile

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 AM Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>
> When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet
> processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents
> are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled.
> Notifier chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With
> large numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously
> the CPUs spend too much time with interrupts disabled.
>
> Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification,
> maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this
> registration already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write
> mostly, so a normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents
> must be checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down
> per device.
>
> Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of
> similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings
> when notified.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> CC: paul@paul-moore.com
> CC: ddutile@redhat.com
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
> ---
>  drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h |  5 +++
>  drivers/infiniband/core/device.c    |  1 +
>  drivers/infiniband/core/security.c  | 50 ++++++++++++++++-------------
>  include/rdma/ib_mad.h               |  3 +-
>  4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

This looks reasonable from a SELinux perspective.  I would still be
curious to see how this would compare to calling
security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() directly in
ip_mad_enforce_security(), but at least this patch should fix the
problem you're seeing.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> index 616734313f0c..6fd3d3d06d18 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>                                 enum ib_qp_type qp_type);
>  void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent);
>  int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index);
> +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void);
>  #else
>  static inline void ib_security_destroy_port_pkey_list(struct ib_device *device)
>  {
> @@ -264,6 +265,10 @@ static inline int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map,
>  {
>         return 0;
>  }
> +
> +static inline void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
> +{
> +}
>  #endif
>
>  struct ib_device *ib_device_get_by_index(u32 ifindex);
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> index 238ec42778ef..8c1d8ffb09e2 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int ib_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
>                 return NOTIFY_DONE;
>
>         schedule_work(&ib_policy_change_work);
> +       ib_mad_agent_security_change();
>
>         return NOTIFY_OK;
>  }
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> index 7662e9347238..a70d2ba312ed 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
>  #include "core_priv.h"
>  #include "mad_priv.h"
>
> +static LIST_HEAD(mad_agent_list);
> +/* Lock to protect mad_agent_list */
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mad_agent_list_lock);
> +
>  static struct pkey_index_qp_list *get_pkey_idx_qp_list(struct ib_port_pkey *pp)
>  {
>         struct pkey_index_qp_list *pkey = NULL;
> @@ -676,19 +680,18 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
>         return security_ib_pkey_access(sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
>  }
>
> -static int ib_mad_agent_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb,
> -                                       unsigned long event,
> -                                       void *data)
> +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
>  {
> -       struct ib_mad_agent *ag = container_of(nb, struct ib_mad_agent, lsm_nb);
> -
> -       if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE)
> -               return NOTIFY_DONE;
> -
> -       ag->smp_allowed = !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(
> -               ag->security, dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num);
> -
> -       return NOTIFY_OK;
> +       struct ib_mad_agent *ag;
> +
> +       spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +       list_for_each_entry(ag,
> +                           &mad_agent_list,
> +                           mad_agent_sec_list)
> +               WRITE_ONCE(ag->smp_allowed,
> +                          !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(ag->security,
> +                               dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num));
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>  }
>
>  int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
> @@ -699,6 +702,8 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>         if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
>                 return 0;
>
> +       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
> +
>         ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
>         if (ret)
>                 return ret;
> @@ -706,22 +711,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>         if (qp_type != IB_QPT_SMI)
>                 return 0;
>
> +       spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         ret = security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(agent->security,
>                                                 dev_name(&agent->device->dev),
>                                                 agent->port_num);
>         if (ret)
>                 goto free_security;
>
> -       agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change;
> -       ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> -       if (ret)
> -               goto free_security;
> -
> -       agent->smp_allowed = true;
> -       agent->lsm_nb_reg = true;
> +       WRITE_ONCE(agent->smp_allowed, true);
> +       list_add(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list, &mad_agent_list);
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         return 0;
>
>  free_security:
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
>         return ret;
>  }
> @@ -731,8 +734,11 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>         if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
>                 return;
>
> -       if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
> -               unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> +       if (agent->qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
> +               spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +               list_del(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
> +               spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +       }
>
>         security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
>  }
> @@ -743,7 +749,7 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
>                 return 0;
>
>         if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
> -               if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
> +               if (!READ_ONCE(map->agent.smp_allowed))
>                         return -EACCES;
>                 return 0;
>         }
> diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> index 1c0b914f199d..79ba8219e7dc 100644
> --- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> +++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> @@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ struct ib_mad_agent {
>         u32                     hi_tid;
>         u32                     flags;
>         void                    *security;
> -       struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
> +       struct list_head        mad_agent_sec_list;
>         u8                      port_num;
>         u8                      rmpp_version;
>         bool                    smp_allowed;
> -       bool                    lsm_nb_reg;
>  };
>
>  /**
> --
> 2.19.1
>


-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes
  2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
@ 2019-02-08 23:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2019-02-08 23:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Leon Romanovsky
  Cc: Doug Ledford, Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens,
	Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile

On Sat, Feb 02, 2019 at 11:09:41AM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
> 
> Hi,
> 
> This is second version of previously sent patch "IB/core: Don't register
> MAD agents for LSM notifications", due to the fact that we found extra
> things to fix during the review, I grouped that patch together with
> other fixes in that area.
> 
> Thanks
> 
> Daniel Jurgens (4):
>   IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security
>   IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents
>   IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct
>   IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier

Applied to for-next

Thanks,
Jason

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore
2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe

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