From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C15BC282CE for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF6122084B for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="gcxccMEz" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726736AbfDITTI (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 15:19:08 -0400 Received: from sonic309-27.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com ([98.137.65.153]:38252 "EHLO sonic309-27.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726761AbfDITTG (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 15:19:06 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1554837545; bh=kBs6xavdKLksOJrpeyZAKYy1l7B4qvl4+o1ibk1YtLg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=gcxccMEzrmEvi8EL3OZsrPybqFNidXpKjZufexe/wxIAyw2hKCBZLGD1WKFIFKec1Z1gqpDqDwnaBQA+nu1KpYyNPVBbsR9Sfm5zqdTSbA6kB4LGkV7evJVuy4kGn3pzdKPvlJ5nylZoS/ANvFEfUBHcKQM33nQCokPho/7LFwWSUaAw/2e6igzJ8HSz4F/GtZyy8WacYouurp0g9ESJ4iPVr3zOt4JgNBp3sJZk2yYZ/yuhpnRgDD0PAy1l03ey/TXTWa2BmuID1LnnnQy/tfrqNzRpQ1+fVImxnlNXNgM2+y2kcaU8IdiUj6SHKIj7DYPs4wr9eRkRG4p3IbSXCw== X-YMail-OSG: 5eBdqI4VM1mSwqPwu5KSaW_MDg3gVPouySLM_Jebp4NPRnozBLBEPmRaJTJuMYC hV4QRXlWrfj.tCBO88QNjvfWYyx3mJx52bwE1quFf1JVsZb5eXu8PZlvih0SMNLU_1HkQD_PCBQX LzEgDaPeSWTYLJxfNGxrtrgXT07JmiUE8nzcZbtUF2GIiNodoHJQmxmoio837fLJ_PUCK2POhwqx S6q2Bh73bDbIliUicuRgpviPRS7qJIP8tk5tjkaElHytTaQ5TVrZicDI5mh.Yfffj47RQJpmjFcO bN1FntoTt_oz77vi24pMGd3QAHzxeLOoLH7UtuE2At8Bl_gDkvoajD1ZEZ8kSgakbSjGo2AiQd.3 qFum209rSf08UU77c.9bKbH8US0xjxVsaN8EGZqKbj3y308Ixwu9OjNx31CmDZ3LjEBMgIDGHMG6 k2_PcKhbCm74C.jAC9mHyyh7Nc7amaTaccI03ruCSUsSwLEDpVSLm.KkZW9XVPrDZ60Bt2URH5lO qulMWPeRB1rWDmZmzwx61MJd8KJlQFHQsZADEIQ0KdKuDmlm.sXdcwvmIw7GbNdEagX4pfS6VtL0 Cne.8Z16NJSjsc_J38fNAYL_YUZgeO8_UKZN1IWf5y36lMeA5uGBYw6ndF4KySBya4MlHwMB7r14 txUdEURVgGSFAefN2V9Fnu6bFhpV8.703tUEeQQKlPwED8vVBYTYjdFWHHwOC6_U9HgKKpMfYqJ7 I_BWQYdZkEu4JF_Fk9GhzEp0ziSQe0xRAqO9mVhX_rhQKglf1U0PdrxpEMmTSYvK86fYHjDdwQyQ mVURkZQ1EftqFJgISC.0XhSPpH3xw1iKYUsJyBPWDaDNmOg6OaXAgR5.X2puJUSRAi5YzPi2VPN_ hVyaTMesXm70TH4HG0p5RGqM7P9YRUsTfIcXyLBLrjhhK6cUCA4Nz9ZFlW7R8Ro993c1tiEoLRkb wD4wJbv4DGcrCQgWSaEUSBIi4c5h9XL38LfaYaOuE1fQAv1MoFCaY9KiCK3k2fLP8bFRedVwgeol 2ztQMTPumkdakLr1EK7B7iTVM5YfbwgTFZmGPT.JBMqnb5Ncj93wjNCp4GxSMnRA.0XoxPBNRqvQ YWH0.f1DhE4IChjo4J_cCtGQWUAYRZIUhUYq3y39Vwvdm91IjSxmsmcg- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic309.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:05 +0000 Received: from c-67-169-65-224.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (EHLO localhost.localdomain) ([67.169.65.224]) by smtp401.mail.gq1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 54e8f28a4675c25365c7725d1b772c7b; Tue, 09 Apr 2019 19:19:03 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:18:03 -0700 Message-Id: <20190409191848.1380-15-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20190409191848.1380-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20190409191848.1380-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++-- security/security.c | 48 ++--------------------------- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l) memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l)); } +/** + * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export + * @data: the containing data structure + * @secid: where to put the one that matters. + * + * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. + */ +static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid) +{ + switch (data->flags) { + case LSM_EXPORT_NONE: + *secid = 0; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX: + *secid = data->selinux; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK: + *secid = data->smack; + break; + case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR: + *secid = data->apparmor; + break; + default: + pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__, + data->flags); + *secid = 0; + break; + } +} + +static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid) +{ + data->selinux = secid; + data->smack = secid; + data->apparmor = secid; + data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | + LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR; +} + /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts); @@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else @@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsm_export le; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsm_export le; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } @@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) { @@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsm_export le; int retried = 0; if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) @@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) RC; \ }) -/** - * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export - * @data: the containing data structure - * @secid: where to put the one that matters. - * - * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. - */ -static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid) -{ - switch (data->flags) { - case LSM_EXPORT_NONE: - *secid = 0; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX: - *secid = data->selinux; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK: - *secid = data->smack; - break; - case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR: - *secid = data->apparmor; - break; - default: - pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__, - data->flags); - *secid = 0; - break; - } -} - -static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid) -{ - data->selinux = secid; - data->smack = secid; - data->apparmor = secid; - data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | - LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR; -} - /* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) @@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) { - int rc; - struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule); - lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid); - return rc; + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule); } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -- 2.19.1