From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E242C10F0E for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A0892084F for ; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="OmSpPmrz" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726841AbfDITTR (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 15:19:17 -0400 Received: from sonic313-26.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com ([98.137.65.89]:44774 "EHLO sonic313-26.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726730AbfDITTQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 15:19:16 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1554837555; bh=WdnFJNhqMM887DyLRoNCsL62MRkkEDeoMEYJROIA3Sw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=OmSpPmrzMO11FJI/w9Pu6kSt1UnK0hcCC9tAwxP79J+jgmo8o+nM1quZPGjNVrYYatcs3JHKinUmiVkhpL9VEYJ822j0AIk2T+u1r2hrwbTaPWhHUcP0VN/NV/DpNIvREzkhkqRcPwdK4e8j7myCS8HnhWSf9Ecqa47JftQ+e8viLUOdIufmpoaqGmC+lRkMe2s3orBDWBEeE+q36GEaqA67G2G1doh4MAJgwxTcPS8IVmxIO17hNo/kWugf2wACs89nKB5r9WFgzA9K9ljDUR1aNH0jiLu40al3RrDd3HgDh9Y8GPElsD6Z9vSHIs8M2K26K2lxKCOV6zHac5WoTg== X-YMail-OSG: b_XjZREVM1lMzadR2eJyrTRrBvUK2kZlF5NeTMBiji9t8Az7r1XBn0T3LrYZlPM IZFaAgDmXmWJdoRlV6S_Q55sQ5Wh7AZfkO4xtF1WPT0xE_74y0e1atno5SI6lfHdGyBe6hlZl7KM Yk6oyxrT2wjmgA4qYg8Y5nB7jIDefwMzrEdp6xeKcUXlTTXaixjR2G7B2FRFSv1dGR7a1slD2gWS pOHThZ5qWRBnpaIAWhBx1kFIJcchoDfuEB.ytj4J95fXYcr2vhshgJy0hrIeZRGstxf_.LYoZNbF h7ti53EilDy4285Q3YCHMJekCDTCakVagC3mVd0r7TgnRHDu4m_0LQMd_fOqrFXSG.Mr0Z30P3Vb mwlSc9kmHSMOrhqs7mmhcm2d2UPmh3eYLfK2HJk.rsxjxSzDw3PCkeT.4mTjWYTK13CHbgZkpnpm G.LPqGwqNv34WgDzOoX1RlVxtUJMAiaw1fdv7hf5rXpkRs2JHWJygdsG0b8aZ7td0zBd1NXmSfkl lq7widGkCFuFdEl2irgUH0gYe1iQYWd8jBj_ish33vfHNFiOJJbEz0COakeDyn3roLdzTG8ANrNi EIsX9VIF2NQ_4cKFubk_DJck_4Z09h3uNvJ65qsdKvtBP4rDnjOhk.aNl0g7w.RdMOQ.CanN9eGC ljTZUpfEHPbcZtOZfjBFW5e05XJnN_fiK68qdIFjvikz8amUtkaE.ECOC1vqRXtNH5Ekf7xGUXqO TdDqM5matxc.vicTj.5RD3Ld5w06yixNwyysoDvvUrkvSnFXqI2Wgi3d1MjAYugvzFpzsU9X7e7h lG2H2wraVL1D8xnMBpDcAiBwzGv0xXA5orWhDt13JTMPQND8a03HaPPB0c.gJseTfFaSpXg5MKTZ OZRBuEZv2aIfv6CdCEwfboowZFc1G71KQV2X5ZkKs25CskFkGh3yiGhK5rUfDl7Xif0pp9MGoWGa cT59a_GvsAFfxHvk4BCnd_E_lbIAHiREb9tdmpDU4sRMSG3QOhUl2kYaQPaaPALTrqtf5NQq8hhU vJEHUb0KTbL8krFa7i9hFoAw5sA85gNavXlh4KjUJt_CTII1PZeHlTBCnO.1IR3RJHoNkkx6Kex1 ThWXfPnDK34Eq_drPuOCLWqOE9xrGfLYw_GoBbSDULX_KDFGUo5zKt8s- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic313.consmr.mail.gq1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Tue, 9 Apr 2019 19:19:15 +0000 Received: from c-67-169-65-224.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (EHLO localhost.localdomain) ([67.169.65.224]) by smtp401.mail.gq1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 70e478474b1bad4641d6b335096eeb36; Tue, 09 Apr 2019 19:19:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:18:15 -0700 Message-Id: <20190409191848.1380-27-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20190409191848.1380-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20190409191848.1380-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Clean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition. This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++----------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++++------- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d213e835c498..8b109ad0de2e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks { }; /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, @@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr); +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_update_policy(void); void ima_update_policy_flag(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c7505fb122d4..7e493af96134 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @l: LAM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr); + return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index be714afc9fd2..ba64b0b61383 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) */ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; struct lsm_export le; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; security_task_getsecid(current, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &le, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f5efa9ef270d..22b973e743fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsm_export *l, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr); + action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) @@ -335,13 +335,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - u32 secid; struct lsm_export le; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -364,19 +362,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; - u32 secid; struct lsm_export le; security_task_getsecid(current, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } @@ -392,12 +387,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; struct lsm_export le; security_task_getsecid(current, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -506,7 +499,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; struct lsm_export le; if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { @@ -530,8 +522,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &le); - lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 280f2410e551..fae4718d24f9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) { int i; @@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, + rc = security_filter_rule_match(l, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @l: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr) +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask)) + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask)) continue; action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; -- 2.19.1