From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>, Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>, Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>, Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>, Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@intel.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 08:55:49 -0700 Message-ID: <20190610155549.GB15995@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190610150600.GA3752@linux.intel.com> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 06:06:00PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:11:41PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > SGX will use the may_mprotect() hook to prevent userspace from > > circumventing various security checks, e.g. Linux Security Modules. > > Naming it may_mprotect() instead of simply mprotect() is intended to > > reflect the hook's purpose as a way to gate mprotect() as opposed to > > a wholesale replacement. > > "This commit adds may_mprotect() to struct vm_operations_struct, which > can be used to ask from the owner of a VMA if mprotect() is allowed." > > This would be more appropriate statement because that is what the code > change aims for precisely. I did not even understand what you meant by > gating in this context. I would leave SGX and LSM's (and especially > "various security checks", which means abssolutely nothing) out of the > first paragraph completely. > > > Enclaves are built by copying data from normal memory into the Enclave > > Page Cache (EPC). Due to the nature of SGX, the EPC is represented by a > > single file that must be MAP_SHARED, i.e. mprotect() only ever sees a > > MAP_SHARED vm_file that references single file path. Furthermore, all > > enclaves will need read, write and execute pages in the EPC. > > I would just say that "Due to the fact that EPC is delivered as IO > memory from the preboot firmware, it can be only mapped as MAP_SHARED". > It is what it is. I was trying to convey that the nature of SGX itself requires that an enclave's pages are shared between process. E.g. {MAP,VM}_SHARED would be required even if we modified the mmu to handle EPC memory in such a way that it didn't have to be tagged with VM_PFNMAP. > > As a result, LSM policies cannot be meaningfully applied, e.g. an LSM > > can deny access to the EPC as a whole, but can't deny PROT_EXEC on page > > that originated in a non-EXECUTE file (which is long gone by the time > > mprotect() is called). > > I have hard time following what is paragraph is trying to say. > > > By hooking mprotect(), SGX can make explicit LSM upcalls while an > > enclave is being built, i.e. when the kernel has a handle to origin of > > each enclave page, and enforce the result of the LSM policy whenever > > userspace maps the enclave page in the future. > > "LSM policy whenever calls mprotect()"? I'm no sure why you mean by > mapping here and if there is any need to talk about future. Isn't this > needed now? Future is referring to the timeline of a running kernel, not the future of the kernel code. Rather than trying to explain all of the above with words, I'll provide code examples to show how ->may_protect() will be used by SGX and why it is the preferred solution. > > Alternatively, SGX could play games with MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}, but > > that approach is quite ugly, e.g. would require userspace to call an > > SGX ioctl() prior to using mprotect() to extend a page's protections. > > Instead of talking "playing games" I would state what could be done with > VM_MAY{READ,WRITE,EXEC} and why it is bad. Leaves questions otherwise. > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > > --- > > include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ > > mm/mprotect.c | 15 +++++++++++---- > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > > index 0e8834ac32b7..a697996040ac 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > > @@ -458,6 +458,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct { > > void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area); > > int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr); > > int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area); > > + int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long start, > > + unsigned long end, unsigned long prot); > > Could be just boolean. > > /Jarkko
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-06-06 2:11 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson [this message] 2019-06-10 17:47 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-10 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 22:06 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 15:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 17:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 18:29 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-10 22:28 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-12 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-12 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 18:20 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 16:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-11 17:21 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson 2019-06-07 19:58 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-10 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 16:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson 2019-06-07 21:16 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-10 16:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-17 16:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing 2019-06-11 13:40 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-11 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-12 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 7:25 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-12 19:30 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-12 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 0:10 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 1:02 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-13 23:03 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 23:17 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 0:31 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-16 22:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-17 17:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 15:40 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-14 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 17:45 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 17:53 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-16 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-14 23:19 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-11 22:55 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 18:00 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-13 19:48 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 21:09 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 21:02 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 17:36 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
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