On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 12:35:09PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 8/16/19 3:27 AM, Dominick Grift wrote:
> > As of systemd v243rc1 I have been noticing bpf prog_load and prog_run access checks for systemd --user instances (only if secure boot is disabled)
> > I suspect that this is for IPAddressAllow/Deny= functionality.
> > So i tried it out and I was not allowed to use the above due to lack of root-access.
> > 
> > Then i read this:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/4F52274A-CD70-4261-A255-2C4A7E818141@fb.com/T/#t
> > 
> > My question is: Is it expected that BPF prog_load and prog_run is checked when an *unprivileged* process, i suppose, tries to load and run bpf progs?
> > 
> > Are prog_load and prog_run unprivileged operations?
> 
> They can be checked for processes that do not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN if that is
> what you are asking.  This can occur either during bpf(2) system call

Yes I suppose that was what I was asking. According to an LWN article today unprivileged bpf is not going to happen.
Thus i dontaudited these two since it does not work presently, and it is not going to work in the future.

https://defensec.nl/gitweb/?p=dssp2.git;a=commitdiff;h=1ef329b09a3bee549cd08640663ba5e8ed9d3f56

Thanks

> processing if unprivileged_bpf_disabled is 0 (for prog_load and/or
> prog_run), or upon receiving a bpf prog fd from another process (for
> prog_run). It is possible that the specific operation will nonetheless fail
> due to a later CAP_SYS_ADMIN check applied for specific kinds of bpf
> programs.  So it depends on the specifics.
> 
> Android policy appears to have changed over time, with netd originally
> allowed both prog_load and prog_run (but not sys_admin), and then later bpf
> program loading was migrated into a separate bpfloader process (with
> prog_load but not sys_admin) and netd was reduced to prog_run, and still
> later sys_admin was added to bpfloader to enable loading bpf programs with
> tracepoints. Similarly there has been an evolution in the handling of bpf
> maps.

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Dominick Grift