From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v8 07/28] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 16:29:14 -0700 Message-ID: <20190829232935.7099-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190829232935.7099-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx() code is brought in line with the lsmblob. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 313e45a3cac3..dcf20da87d1b 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how); int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct lsmblob *blob); int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority); void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk); void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); @@ -1418,7 +1419,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __ return -ENOPROTOOPT; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct lsmblob *blob) { return -ENOPROTOOPT; } diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644 --- a/include/net/af_unix.h +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms { kgid_t gid; struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - u32 secid; /* Security ID */ + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Security LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout; diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644 --- a/include/net/scm.h +++ b/include/net/scm.h @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie { struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */ + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */ #endif }; @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm) { - security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid); + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob); } #else static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm) @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc int err; if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) { - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0], + &secdata, &seclen); if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c index 82f341e84fae..2a5c868ce135 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb, static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) { + struct lsmblob lb; char *secdata; - u32 seclen, secid; + u32 seclen; int err; - err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid); + err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb); if (err) return; - err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen); + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen); if (err) return; diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index ddb838a1b74c..c50a004a1389 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) { - UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid; + UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob; } static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid; + scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob; } static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) { - return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid); + return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob)); } #else static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index fa7ab1334f22..fe76dfa0f2fd 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2120,10 +2120,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, - skb, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram, + list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + if (rc != 0) + break; + } + return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); -- 2.20.1
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-29 23:29 [PATCH v8 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 01/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler 2019-09-16 18:19 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2019-09-16 18:42 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-09-18 7:19 ` John Johansen 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 03/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler 2019-09-16 18:47 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 04/28] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2019-09-16 19:15 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-09-23 15:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 05/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 14/28] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 15/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 16/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 18/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 19/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 20/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 21/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 22/28] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler 2019-09-18 17:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 23/28] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 24/28] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 25/28] LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 26/28] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2019-08-29 23:29 ` [PATCH v8 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2019-09-04 19:13 ` [PATCH v8 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2019-09-06 13:46 ` Stephen Smalley
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