From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] LSM: Drop security_delete_hooks()
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 14:31:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200107133154.588958-1-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)
This is a third iteration of the attempt to fix a race condition in
SELinux runtime disable. [1] [2]
This version takes the approach of removing the security_delete_hooks()
function (and CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS) and just returning from
the hooks early when SELinux has been disabled on runtime. Note that the
runtime disable functionality is being deprecated and this is only a
temporary solution.
The first patch is an SMP semantics cleanup in SELinux; the second one
builds on top of it and does the actual conversion.
Tested on Fedora Rawhide by running selinux-testsuite with SELinux
enabled + boot tested with SELINUX=disabled. Also compile-tested with
all LSMs enabled in config.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20191211140833.939845-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20191209075756.123157-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/
Ondrej Mosnacek (2):
selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully
security,selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks()
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 31 --
security/Kconfig | 5 -
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 +-
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 5 +-
security/selinux/Kconfig | 6 -
security/selinux/hooks.c | 763 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/include/security.h | 33 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 38 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 6 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 715 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)
--
2.24.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-01-07 13:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-07 13:31 Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 18:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:45 ` James Morris
2020-01-10 20:22 ` Paul Moore
2020-01-10 20:21 ` Paul Moore
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks() Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:47 ` [PATCH 2/2] security, selinux: " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-08 5:31 ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08 8:15 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 13:45 ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08 14:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 16:46 ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: " Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:59 ` James Morris
2020-01-08 8:21 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 18:47 ` James Morris
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