From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Cc: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <kafai@fb.com>,
"Song Liu" <songliubraving@fb.com>, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
shuah@kernel.org, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"SElinux list" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
"Linux kernel mailing list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 16:35:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220708143511.wx4oix4efvy5pmkh@wittgenstein> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3dbd5b30-f869-b284-1383-309ca6994557@cloudflare.com>
On Fri, Jul 08, 2022 at 09:01:32AM -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> On 7/8/22 7:10 AM, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> > ,On Fri, 8 Jul 2022 at 00:32, Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
> > > used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent
> > > a call to create_user_ns().
> > >
> > > The calls look something like this:
> > >
> > > cred = prepare_creds()
> > > security_prepare_creds()
> > > call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
> > > if (cred)
> > > create_user_ns(cred)
> > >
> > > We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
> > > introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
> > >
> > > The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
> > > is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
> > > meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
> > >
> > > Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
> > > a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
> > >
> > > This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
> > > and create_user_ns LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
> >
> > Some thoughts:
> >
> > I.
> >
> > Why not make the hook more generic, e.g. support all other existing
> > and potential future namespaces?
>
> The main issue with a generic hook is that different namespaces have
> different calling contexts. We decided in a previous discussion to opt-out
> of a generic hook for this reason. [1]
Agreed.
>
> > Also I think the naming scheme is <object>_<verb>.
>
> That's a good call out. I was originally hoping to keep the security_*()
> match with the hook name matched with the caller function to keep things all
> aligned. If no one objects to renaming the hook, I can rename the hook for
> v3.
>
> >
> > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_create, const struct cred *cred,
> > unsigned int flags)
> >
> > where flags is a bitmap of CLONE flags from include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> > (like CLONE_NEWUSER).
> >
> > II.
> >
> > While adding policing for namespaces maybe also add a new hook for setns(2)
> >
> > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_join, const struct cred *subj, const
> > struct cred *obj, unsigned int flags)
> >
>
> IIUC, setns() will create a new namespace for the other namespaces except
> for user namespace. If we add a security hook for the other create_*_ns()
setns() doesn't create new namespaces. It just switches to already
existing ones:
setns(<pidfd>, <flags>)
-> prepare_nsset()
/*
* Notice the 0 passed as flags which means all namespaces will
* just take a reference.
*/
-> create_new_namespaces(0, ...)
you're thinking about unshare() and unshare() will be caught in
create_user_ns().
> functions, then we can catch setns() at that point.
If you block the creation of user namespaces by unprivileged users in
create_user_ns() you can only create user namespaces as a privileged
user. Consequently only a privileged users can setns() to a user
namespace. So either the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the parent userns
or they are located in the parent userns and are the owner of the userns
they are attaching to. So if you lock create_user_ns() to
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) you should be done.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-08 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-07 22:32 [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-07-07 22:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-07 22:32 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_create_user_ns() sleepable Frederick Lawler
2022-07-07 22:32 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook Frederick Lawler
2022-07-07 22:32 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-20 1:32 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-20 14:57 ` Frederick Lawler
[not found] ` <CA+EEuAhfMrg=goGhWxVW2=i4Z7mVN4GvfzettvX8T+tFcOPKCw@mail.gmail.com>
2022-07-20 14:52 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-08 12:10 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Christian Göttsche
2022-07-08 14:01 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-08 14:35 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2022-07-08 16:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-14 14:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-07-19 19:59 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-20 1:32 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-20 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-20 22:39 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220708143511.wx4oix4efvy5pmkh@wittgenstein \
--to=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=cgzones@googlemail.com \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=fred@cloudflare.com \
--cc=jackmanb@chromium.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.fastabend@gmail.com \
--cc=kafai@fb.com \
--cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=revest@chromium.org \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=songliubraving@fb.com \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=yhs@fb.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).