From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com, sfrench@samba.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
rgb@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
SELinux <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 22/27] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 17:39:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <32623.1550252354@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <758871dc-15b7-ed5c-a119-a40037309507@tycho.nsa.gov>
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -6560,6 +6560,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > {
> > struct key *key;
> > struct key_security_struct *ksec;
> > + unsigned oldstyle_perm;
> > u32 sid;
> > /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
> > @@ -6568,13 +6569,26 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> > if (perm == 0)
> > return 0;
> > + oldstyle_perm = perm & (KEY_NEED_VIEW | KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_WRITE
> > |
> > + KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_LINK);
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_SETSEC)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_INVAL)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_REVOKE && !(perm & OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_JOIN)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
> > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_CLEAR)
> > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE;
> > +
> > sid = cred_sid(cred);
> > key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
> > ksec = key->security;
> > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> > - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
> > + sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, oldstyle_perm, NULL);
>
> This might be ok temporarily for compatibility but we'll want to ultimately
> define the new permissions in SELinux and switch over to using them if a new
> policy capability bit is set to indicate that the policy supports them. We
> should probably decouple the SELinux permission bits from the KEY_NEED_*
> values and explicitly map them all at the same time.
Sounds reasonable. I should probably detach the first two ACL patches from
the set and push them separately.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-15 17:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <155024683432.21651.14153938339749694146.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
[not found] ` <155024709026.21651.7275876165845045967.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
2019-02-15 17:32 ` [RFC PATCH 22/27] KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL Stephen Smalley
2019-02-15 17:39 ` David Howells [this message]
2019-09-30 16:39 ` Richard Haines
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=32623.1550252354@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=rgb@redhat.com \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sfrench@samba.org \
--cc=trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).