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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 10:30:24 -0800
Message-ID: <3c356ac1-8dd1-7d89-38ed-820e22dcecc7@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhS6pGycbT1GET5CHjxgYCDu1KCrcPtcF0n==1oH15kAVA@mail.gmail.com>

On 1/10/2019 5:57 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 12:08 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 1/9/2019 8:28 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
>>> This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
>>> initializing the security data for newly created pseudo filesystem
>>> objects (such as kernfs nodes) that provide a way of storing a
>>> non-default security context, but need to operate independently from
>>> mounts.
>>>
>>> The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
>>> the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
>>> security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
>>> for handling the creation of new nodes.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
>>> ---
>>>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  include/linux/security.h  | 14 ++++++++++++++
>>>  security/security.c       | 10 ++++++++++
>>>  3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> index aaeb7fa24dc4..3a2399d7721f 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> @@ -429,6 +429,31 @@
>>>   *   to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
>>>   *   and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
>>>   *
>>> + * Security hooks for special file-like objects
>>> + *
>>> + * @object_init_security:
>> I don't like the name. There are too many things that are "objects"
>> for this to be meaningful. I also dislike seeing names like
>> security_object_init_security. How about init_from_parent? If there's
>> never a chance that it will be used anywhere but with kernfs, it could
>> be kernfs_node_init. The existing set of hook names are sufficiently
>> confusing without adding to the mystery.
> I like the naming similarity with inode_init_security(), that seems
> helpful.  Although I somewhat understand you concern about the generic
> "object".  Could you live with kernfs_init_security()?  If another fs
> adopts it, we could always changing the name later if needed.

I can live with it as is, but kernfs_init_security would
be better. The security_blah_security names seem crazy to
me, but changing object to kernfs is really what's important.


  reply index

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09 16:28 [PATCH v2 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 17:08   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-11  1:57     ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 18:30       ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-01-14  9:01       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] kernfs: Initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-11 20:52   ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-09 17:19 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Casey Schaufler
2019-01-09 20:37   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-09 22:03     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-10 14:15       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-10 17:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-10 19:37           ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11  2:20             ` Paul Moore
2019-01-14  9:01               ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-11 18:22             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-14  9:01           ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-22  8:49             ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-22 14:17               ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-22 15:26                 ` Stephen Smalley

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