From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6146C43331 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 08:50:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1292208E4 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 08:50:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387775AbgDBIuW (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 04:50:22 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:59539 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387749AbgDBIuW (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2020 04:50:22 -0400 IronPort-SDR: zZd4+zcQV+XZdwQDHnZWRqw0fL0R/HtL94e2hoMagjJWazNaXlGdHB7oaVZMvmgm5PHqTPAvKU dTAB2O1J9qew== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 02 Apr 2020 01:50:21 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 6MSYiMJuOhiU2alUiULY1LKtfNUB4QznrFYyxc4RsdjpqkzNomV/7NVksmCz9DVzexJUSPYkL5 yPfeIfDIo4cQ== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,335,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="252926535" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by orsmga006.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 02 Apr 2020 01:50:21 -0700 Received: from [10.249.226.252] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.249.226.252]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AD7C580781; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 01:50:16 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH v8 08/12] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process From: Alexey Budankov To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Alexei Starovoitov , Ingo Molnar , James Morris , Namhyung Kim Cc: Serge Hallyn , Jiri Olsa , Song Liu , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Thomas Gleixner , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , linux-man@vger.kernel.org References: Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <8cc98809-d35b-de0f-de02-4cf554f3cf62@linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 11:50:15 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Acked-by: Helge Deller Acked-by: James Morris Reviewed-by: James Morris --- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c index e1a8fee3ad49..d46b6709ec56 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, else return -EFAULT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; if (count != sizeof(uint32_t)) -- 2.24.1