From: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 15:12:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACpbjYqBL3a6iVuN9NGzLLHdENC-EXNsNikJZsEhpvCkCGEM2A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFqZXNsuJ7S9zFhHBJNJxUr4=_ZGmKdzTU29PrWRuziMfJJkGQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 1:14 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> I might be missing something, but couldn't you achieve the same by
> simply adding something like this in here:
>
> if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> (Or by adding it to the condition above.)
>
> Then you should hit this condition here and be all set:
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.7-rc7/source/fs/xattr.c#L337
Hi Ondrej,
Yes, that looks promising. Two questions with that approach:
1. Is there a concern here with transiently returning -EOPNOTSUPP even
if the SELinux LSM does technically support the inode_getsecurity
hook? I'm thinking of potential corner-cases down the road where
somehow this knowledge is cached.
2. The selinux_inode_getsecurity hook today does somewhat handle the
uninitialized case. It ends up here:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.7-rc7/source/security/selinux/ss/services.c#L1322.
Specifically, it has support for initial SIDs. The patch I wrote
purposely tries to allow falling back to that logic. Is there a
concern with short-circuiting this logic even if the inode SID somehow
isn't SECINITSID_UNLABELED?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-26 19:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-23 19:51 [PATCH] selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded Jonathan Lebon
2020-05-25 17:14 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-05-26 19:12 ` Jonathan Lebon [this message]
2020-05-27 8:23 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-05-27 13:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-26 20:20 ` Jonathan Lebon
2020-05-27 22:06 Jonathan Lebon
2020-05-27 22:11 ` Jonathan Lebon
2020-05-28 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-28 14:58 ` Jonathan Lebon
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