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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 07:22:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ43MY28wXbQrXNZSaAQ-OaLa6q4VRje61WSUXjWfmOimQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFqZXNtTV0PS26MYXO3urLvNYiaV9mG2kNqU9+syAnJCPhZ2jA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 4:01 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 3:57 AM Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> > On 2021-02-12 19:59:30, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > > Commit 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
> > > selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
> > > security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
> > > rather serious bug.
> > >
> > > The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
> > > convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
> > > the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
> > > and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c3b, selinux_policy_commit() was
> > > called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
> > > pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
> > > but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
> > > on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
> > > memory accesses.
> > >
> > > This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
> > > ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
> > > performance"):
> > > ```
> > > function rand_cat() {
> > >       echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
> > > }
> > >
> > > function do_work() {
> > >       while true; do
> > >               echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
> > >                       >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
> > >       done
> > > }
> > >
> > > do_work >/dev/null &
> > > do_work >/dev/null &
> > > do_work >/dev/null &
> > >
> > > while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
> > >
> > > kill %1
> > > kill %2
> > > kill %3
> > > ```
> > >
> > > Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
> > > dynamically and passing them among the
> > > selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.
> > >
> > > Note that this commit also fixes the minor issue of logging a
> > > MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record in case sel_make_policy_nodes() fails (in
> > > which case the new policy isn't actually loaded).
> > >
> > > Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
> > > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> >
> > Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
> >
> > Feel free to leave those tags on your v3 submission after making the two
> > small changes requested by Paul.
>
> Thanks!

I haven't seen a final version of these patches yet.  Did I miss it?

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-18 11:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-12 18:59 [PATCH v2 0/2] selinux: policy load fixes Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-02-12 18:59 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-02-25 18:14   ` Paul Moore
2021-02-26 14:46     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-02-28 18:52       ` Paul Moore
2021-03-03  2:55         ` Tyler Hicks
2021-03-03  8:54           ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-18 14:48             ` Paul Moore
2021-03-18 15:12               ` Stephen Smalley
2021-02-12 18:59 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-02-25 19:20   ` Paul Moore
2021-02-26 14:47     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-03  2:57   ` Tyler Hicks
2021-03-03  9:01     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-18 11:22       ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2021-03-18 11:45         ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-18 14:49           ` Paul Moore

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