From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: do not override context on context mounts
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 22:49:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFqZXNsWVRZKEj5K_WMO7kPbigXDOkG8T6GYyYHq5oi3kR8U7Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b9fbfb5c-fc8f-fe02-13b1-998a00b1a7f5@tycho.nsa.gov>
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 9:45 PM Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On 12/21/18 3:18 PM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
> > flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
> > selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
> > in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
> > selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
> >
> > This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
> > 'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
> > explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
> > remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
> > having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
> >
> > Steps to reproduce:
> > # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> > # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
> > # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> > total 0
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
> > # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> > # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> >
> > Result before:
> > # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> > total 0
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
> >
> > Result after:
> > # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> > total 0
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
> > -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
>
> The patch looks good to me but I am a little puzzled by the cgroup2
> behavior here. I would have expected that unmounting would have killed
> the superblock and thus discarded the previously set label. I guess
> something else is keeping it alive?
It is because the context set via setxattr is stored inside the kernfs
node and the kernfs tree is preserved across mounts/unmounts. It
actually behaves sort of like a normal filesystem backed by a block
device, just the "device" is represented by an in-memory kernfs tree
which is discarded at poweroff.
>
> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Thanks!
>
> > ---
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index b4759bebeddc..fcf4af1e5157 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -3477,12 +3477,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> > const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> > {
> > struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
> > + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> > u32 newsid;
> > int rc;
> >
> > if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
> > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >
> > + if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > if (!value || !size)
> > return -EACCES;
> >
> > @@ -6625,7 +6629,10 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
> > */
> > static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
> > {
> > - return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
> > + int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
> > + ctx, ctxlen, 0);
> > + /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
> > + return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
> > }
> >
> > /*
> >
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-21 21:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-21 20:18 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix SELinux context mount with the cgroup filesystem Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-21 20:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-12-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: do not override context " Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-21 20:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-12-21 21:49 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2018-12-21 22:59 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 2:28 ` Paul Moore
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