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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] selinux: add SELinux hooks for lockdown integrity and confidentiality
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 05:47:18 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRoBGgw3YrACh5LffcFhDMefEqF7dWuqD+bEadFMr5o3A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <365ca063-6efd-8051-8d4b-5c8aef0d2e12@tycho.nsa.gov>

On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 11:29 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On 10/30/19 9:16 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > Add SELinux access control hooks for lockdown integrity and
> > confidentiality. This effectively mimics the current implementation of
> > lockdown (caveat noted below). If lockdown is enabled alongside SELinux,
> > then the lockdown access control will take precedence over the SELinux
> > lockdown implementation.
> >
> > Note that this SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
> > confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
> > Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow integrity operations while
> > blocking confidentiality operations.
>
> NB This is intended to be the first of a series that will ultimately
> lead to finer-grained controls than just integrity and confidentiality,
> but wanted to get some feedback on it at this stage.  Also anticipate
> greater controversy over exposing finer granularity since the lockdown
> reasons are free to change at any time, so this would be the baseline
> fallback position if finer grained controls are rejected.
>
> > (original patch authored by an intern who wishes to remain anonymous;
> > I am signing off on his behalf)

I'm not going to comment on this on-list because IANAL, but it might
be best to leave the comment above off of future postings as I think
it somewhat confuses the principle behind the sign-off line.  I
understand you want to give credit where it is due, but without an
explicit author's name/email I believe it is safer for you to assume
that role.

Put another way, the comment above makes me nervous about adding my
own sign-off and merging it into the SELinux tree.

> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> > ---
> >   security/selinux/hooks.c            | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 ++
> >   2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-31  9:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-30 13:16 [RFC PATCH] selinux: add SELinux hooks for lockdown integrity and confidentiality Stephen Smalley
2019-10-30 15:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-10-31  9:47   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2019-10-31  9:59 ` Paul Moore
2019-10-31 14:01   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-07 17:48     ` Paul Moore
2019-11-07 18:07       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-08 18:38         ` Paul Moore

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