From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
cj.chengjian@huawei.com, john.johansen@canonical.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:57:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTbNhgO4SHDbmALH_E1CdUSe90vpnvTS=me7Y21NK1dbQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1904200626400.21756@namei.org>
On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 4:27 PM James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 19 Apr 2019, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 2:55 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > Prevent userspace from changing the the /proc/PID/attr values if the
> > > task's credentials are currently overriden. This not only makes sense
> > > conceptually, it also prevents some really bizarre error cases caused
> > > when trying to commit credentials to a task with overridden
> > > credentials.
> > >
> > > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> > > Reported-by: "chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > > ---
> > > fs/proc/base.c | 5 +++++
> > > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > I sent this to the LSM list as I figure it should probably go via
> > James' linux-security tree since it is cross-LSM and doesn't really
> > contain any LSM specific code. That said, if you don't want this
> > James let me know and I'll send it via the SELinux tree assuming I can
> > get ACKs from John and Casey (this should only affect SELinux,
> > AppArmor, and Smack).
>
> This is fine to go via your tree.
Okay. I just merged this into selinux/next. I was sitting on this
patch to see how the other thread developed, but that doesn't really
seem to be reaching any conclusion and I really want this to get at
least one week in -next before the merge window opens.
Thanks everyone.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-29 13:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-19 18:55 [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials Paul Moore
2019-04-19 18:59 ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19 20:26 ` James Morris
2019-04-29 13:57 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2019-04-19 19:03 ` John Johansen
2019-04-21 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAHC9VhTbNhgO4SHDbmALH_E1CdUSe90vpnvTS=me7Y21NK1dbQ@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=cj.chengjian@huawei.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).