From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C3A4C48BE8 for ; Tue, 15 Jun 2021 09:35:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77450613F1 for ; Tue, 15 Jun 2021 09:35:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231550AbhFOJhv (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Jun 2021 05:37:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55436 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231523AbhFOJhm (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Jun 2021 05:37:42 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x636.google.com (mail-ej1-x636.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::636]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 867F9C061283 for ; Tue, 15 Jun 2021 02:35:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x636.google.com with SMTP id nb6so1284240ejc.10 for ; Tue, 15 Jun 2021 02:35:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=/wUc2OfdjdbqnjL6W8FMiwr8yZ9/oxUaW69sqUYNuKM=; b=kNFfY93yyM1OSr4ACCCk1RSsFVhJXWC1MfeZ/3ASEmu5JYM6r+oD/0AT8FYuuOZp3e Z8qLnCYtJiNwPTuT0ipSTL6GWLVciFocanwPijZfqyIaD+yTIrGlutD0qmKWNsTosETJ ZXWxRR+HfQ9bd2jRuElwI9C5LQ8cDz/1J/fAg= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=/wUc2OfdjdbqnjL6W8FMiwr8yZ9/oxUaW69sqUYNuKM=; b=qbsHCCGgA9g9i2wiGaqzPg7qdOkgCZf5+4smg8WtGmCKslTGfHNADflWi7NunDLUyx WhIomkbXmFHWgViGLgkiron/detlZacsjxsK41FolJPuAak23pe9wPF/mn8+2suKGq+m 9fRkOYSzdETOWpU+kewfw9enHaZtQ/VrCwgNWeCT8L6PoD9qQp4GipBsmHo+vhdIJVx3 70ra09iqA5XQNwOITuh3hmwH/c8l/jwQ1kypBdJNl8wMyu35MWszJLo/ZVpfA6oUiSB9 Gqzzio0vohbWsaXoxxcNn8SGPRNrtB4dEvuIceXTFTBVhZRrt4OMeteh0a29Lc4fZVLS RWBw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5339247B8Y6nYKVYMScZkdh066bv9Lr8lOz9fzNCCOsyjDOExWEs PN4xN0BqJu2IfOSlPapxEiaIAn29YBvk2QQoM7Qw7w== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx7fh9LOmwCnFieYYThc9zENem+W4yQBvIwptCjcrQ/iz53nv9g6de5F6QmUpPuE4r+whaklEr/9RvGVhPC8Ao= X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:20ee:: with SMTP id rh14mr19926420ejb.461.1623749732894; Tue, 15 Jun 2021 02:35:32 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200722090758.3221812-1-chirantan@chromium.org> <20210614212808.GD869400@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20210614212808.GD869400@redhat.com> From: Chirantan Ekbote Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 18:35:21 +0900 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RESEND] [PATCHv4 1/2] uapi: fuse: Add FUSE_SECURITY_CTX To: Vivek Goyal Cc: Miklos Szeredi , Stephen Smalley , Stefan Hajnoczi , Linux FS Devel , virtio-fs-list , Dylan Reid , Suleiman Souhlal , fuse-devel , SElinux list Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Hi Vivek, On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 6:28 AM Vivek Goyal wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 06:07:57PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote: > > Add the FUSE_SECURITY_CTX flag for the `flags` field of the > > fuse_init_out struct. When this flag is set the kernel will append the > > security context for a newly created inode to the request (create, > > mkdir, mknod, and symlink). The server is responsible for ensuring that > > the inode appears atomically with the requested security context. > > > > For example, if the server is backed by a "real" linux file system then > > it can write the security context value to > > /proc/thread-self/attr/fscreate before making the syscall to create the > > inode. > > > > Signed-off-by: Chirantan Ekbote > > Hi Chirantan, > > I am wondering what's the status of this work now. Looks like it > was not merged. > > We also need the capability to set selinux security xattrs on newly > created files in virtiofs. > > Will you be interested in reviving this work and send patches again > and copy the selinux as well as linux security module list > (linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org) as suggested by casey. > Not really. We have our own local solution for this (see below) so if you or someone else wants to pick it up, please go ahead. > How are you managing in the meantime. Carrying patches in your own > kernel? > Kind of. This patch series changes the protocol and the feature bit we were using was claimed by FUSE_SUBMOUNTS instead so carrying it locally is not really viable long term. Instead we're carrying a patch similar to the original RFC patch that doesn't change the protocol [1]. Chirantan [1]: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2581172