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From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 11:09:34 -0700
Message-ID: <CAKOZuetUvu=maOmHXjCqkHaYEN5Sf+pKBc3BZ+qpy1tE1NJ9xQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKOZueuus6fVqrKsfNgSYGo-kXJ3f6Mv_NJZStY1Uo934=SjDw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 10:50 AM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 10:11 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 2/17/2020 4:14 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 2:41 PM Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > >> Add support for labeling and controlling access to files attached to anon
> > >> inodes. Introduce extended interfaces for creating such files to permit
> > >> passing a related file as an input to decide how to label the anon
> > >> inode. Define a security hook for initializing the anon inode security
> > >> attributes. Security attributes are either inherited from a related file
> > >> or determined based on some combination of the creating task and policy
> > >> (in the case of SELinux, using type_transition rules).  As an
> > >> example user of the inheritance support, convert kvm to use the new
> > >> interface for passing the related file so that the anon inode can inherit
> > >> the security attributes of /dev/kvm and provide consistent access control
> > >> for subsequent ioctl operations.  Other users of anon inodes, including
> > >> userfaultfd, will default to the transition-based mechanism instead.
> > >>
> > >> Compared to the series in
> > >> https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/,
> > >> this approach differs in that it does not require creation of a separate
> > >> anonymous inode for each file (instead storing the per-instance security
> > >> information in the file security blob), it applies labeling and control
> > >> to all users of anonymous inodes rather than requiring opt-in via a new
> > >> flag, it supports labeling based on a related inode if provided,
> > >> it relies on type transitions to compute the label of the anon inode
> > >> when there is no related inode, and it does not require introducing a new
> > >> security class for each user of anonymous inodes.
> > >>
> > >> On the other hand, the approach in this patch does expose the name passed
> > >> by the creator of the anon inode to the policy (an indirect mapping could
> > >> be provided within SELinux if these names aren't considered to be stable),
> > >> requires the definition of type_transition rules to distinguish userfaultfd
> > >> inodes from proc inodes based on type since they share the same class,
> > >> doesn't support denying the creation of anonymous inodes (making the hook
> > >> added by this patch return something other than void is problematic due to
> > >> it being called after the file is already allocated and error handling in
> > >> the callers can't presently account for this scenario and end up calling
> > >> release methods multiple times), and may be more expensive
> > >> (security_transition_sid overhead on each anon inode allocation).
> > >>
> > >> We are primarily posting this RFC patch now so that the two different
> > >> approaches can be concretely compared.  We anticipate a hybrid of the
> > >> two approaches being the likely outcome in the end.  In particular
> > >> if support for allocating a separate inode for each of these files
> > >> is acceptable, then we would favor storing the security information
> > >> in the inode security blob and using it instead of the file security
> > >> blob.
> > > Bringing this back up in hopes of attracting some attention from the
> > > fs-devel crowd and Al.  As Stephen already mentioned, from a SELinux
> > > perspective we would prefer to attach the security blob to the inode
> > > as opposed to the file struct; does anyone have any objections to
> > > that?
> >
> > Sorry for the delay - been sick the past few days.
> >
> > I agree that the inode is a better place than the file for information
> > about the inode. This is especially true for Smack, which uses
> > multiple extended attributes in some cases. I don't believe that any
> > except the access label will be relevant to anonymous inodes, but
> > I can imagine security modules with policies that would.
> >
> > I am always an advocate of full xattr support. It goes a long
> > way in reducing the number and complexity of special case interfaces.
>
> It sounds like we have broad consensus on using the inode to hold
> security information, implying that anon_inodes should create new
> inodes. Do any of the VFS people want to object?

Ping?

  reply index

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-13 19:41 Stephen Smalley
2020-02-13 19:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-18  0:14 ` Paul Moore
2020-02-20 18:11   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-20 18:50     ` Daniel Colascione
2020-03-10 18:09       ` Daniel Colascione [this message]
2020-03-10 18:26         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-10 21:50           ` Daniel Colascione
2020-03-11 13:31             ` Stephen Smalley

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