selinux.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3] selinux: do not override context on context mounts
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 11:27:46 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a779b0e5-79d5-8a10-8372-488de5f8345f@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181213141739.8534-4-omosnace@redhat.com>

On 12/13/18 9:17 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with the
> SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT behavior.
> 
> This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
> 'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
> explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
> remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
> having a different context.
> 
> Steps to reproduce:
>      # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
>      # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
>      # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
>      total 0
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
>      # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
>      # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
> 
> Result before:
>      # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
>      total 0
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
> 
> Result after:
>      # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
>      total 0
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
>      -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
>      -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
>   security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++++
>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index d6d29ec54eab..0ca5ed30afe1 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6620,6 +6620,13 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
>    */
>   static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>   {
> +	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> +
> +	/* Do not change context in SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case */
> +	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
> +	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
> +		return 0;
> +
>   	return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
>   }

Wondering if we ought to take this into selinux_inode_setsecurity() and 
return -EOPNOTSUPP in that case.  We already return -EOPNOTSUPP from 
selinux_inode_setxattr() if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) and that 
should precede other calls to selinux_inode_setsecurity() IIRC.  Should 
we just be checking SBLABEL_MNT here instead?  And do we need to 
separately check SE_SBINITIALIZED?

  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-13 16:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-13 14:17 [RFC PATCH 0/3] Fix SELinux context mount with the cgroup filesystem Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-13 14:17 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] cgroup: fix parsing empty mount option string Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-13 16:03   ` Tejun Heo
2018-12-28 15:14     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-28 18:32       ` Tejun Heo
2018-12-13 14:17 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-13 16:18   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-12-18 15:38     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-13 14:17 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] selinux: do not override context " Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-13 16:27   ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2018-12-18 15:50     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2018-12-18 19:22       ` Stephen Smalley
2018-12-19 11:44         ` Ondrej Mosnacek

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=a779b0e5-79d5-8a10-8372-488de5f8345f@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --to=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=hannes@cmpxchg.org \
    --cc=lizefan@huawei.com \
    --cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).