Re: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!

From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: "chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
	Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Xiexiuqi (Xie XiuQi)" <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>,
	Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>, Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SELinux <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:17:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d994da06-7f34-e275-3e89-b46192660b99@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhT_nk1jmrTj3W=F+1gP1vU3iZsZ=UGOCwdiBLbUsOc9=w@mail.gmail.com>

On 4/17/19 4:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:27 PM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:57 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>> On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm tempted to simply return an error in selinux_setprocattr() if
>>>>> the task's credentials are not the same as its real_cred;
>>>>
>>>> What about other modules? I have no idea what smack_setprocattr() is,
>>>> but it too does prepare_creds/commit creds.
>>>>
>>>> it seems that the simplest workaround should simply add the additional
>>>> cred == real_cred into proc_pid_attr_write().
>>>
>>> Yes, that is simple, but I worry about what other LSMs might want to
>>> do.  While I believe failing if the effective creds are not the same
>>> as the real_creds is okay for SELinux (possibly Smack too), I worry
>>> about what other LSMs may want to do.  After all,
>>> proc_pid_attr_write() doesn't change the the creds itself, that is
>>> something the specific LSMs do.
>>
>> Yes, but if proc_pid_attr_write() is called with cred != real_cred then
>> something is already wrong?
> 
> True, or at least I would think so.
> 
> Looking at the current tree there are three LSMs which implement
> setprocattr hooks: SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor.  I know Casey has
> already mentioned that he wasn't able to trigger the problem in Smack,
> but looking at smack_setprocattr() I see the similar commit_creds()
> usage so I would expect the same problem in Smack; what say you Casey?
>  Looking at apparmor_setprocattr(), it appears that it too could end
> up calling commit_creds() via aa_set_current_hat().
> 
> Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr
> hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is
> a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to
> make sure John and Casey are okay with that.
> 
> John?

heh yeah,

seems I messed up our check, we actually have

	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
		return -EBUSY;

on the change_profile path and missed it on the change_hat
one.

It makes sense to lift the check up earlier