From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: dominick.grift@defensec.nl, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] libselinux: selinux_set_mapping: fix handling of unknown classes/perms
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 11:11:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e8da7085-91d5-9834-afe2-30d5d8879c62@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190222144139.8396-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
On 2/22/19 9:41 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> The libselinux selinux_set_mapping() implementation was never updated
> to handle unknown classes/permissions based on the policy handle_unknown
> flag. Update it and the internal mapping functions to gracefully
> handle unknown classes/permissions. Add a security_reject_unknown()
> interface to expose the corresponding selinuxfs node and use it when
> creating a mapping to decide whether to fail immediately or proceed.
>
> This enables dbus-daemon and XSELinux, which use selinux_set_mapping(),
> to continue working with the dummy policy or other policies that lack
> their userspace class/permission definitions as long as the policy
> was built with -U allow.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h | 5 +-
> libselinux/src/compute_av.c | 16 +++++--
> libselinux/src/mapping.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
> libselinux/src/mapping.h | 4 +-
> libselinux/src/reject_unknown.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++
> libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h | 1 +
> 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 libselinux/src/reject_unknown.c
>
> diff --git a/libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h b/libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h
> index 01201eee..a34d54fc 100644
> --- a/libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h
> +++ b/libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h
> @@ -328,7 +328,10 @@ extern int security_getenforce(void);
> /* Set the enforce flag value. */
> extern int security_setenforce(int value);
>
> -/* Get the behavior for undefined classes/permissions */
> +/* Get the load-time behavior for undefined classes/permissions */
> +extern int security_reject_unknown(void);
> +
> +/* Get the runtime behavior for undefined classes/permissions */
> extern int security_deny_unknown(void);
>
> /* Get the checkreqprot value */
> diff --git a/libselinux/src/compute_av.c b/libselinux/src/compute_av.c
> index 1d05e7b6..d5741637 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/compute_av.c
> +++ b/libselinux/src/compute_av.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const char * scon,
> char *buf;
> size_t len;
> int fd, ret;
> + security_class_t kclass;
>
> if (!selinux_mnt) {
> errno = ENOENT;
> @@ -38,8 +39,9 @@ int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const char * scon,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + kclass = unmap_class(tclass);
> snprintf(buf, len, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon,
> - unmap_class(tclass), unmap_perm(tclass, requested));
> + kclass, unmap_perm(tclass, requested));
>
> ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf));
> if (ret < 0)
> @@ -60,9 +62,15 @@ int security_compute_av_flags_raw(const char * scon,
> } else if (ret < 6)
> avd->flags = 0;
>
> - /* If tclass invalid, kernel sets avd according to deny_unknown flag */
> - if (tclass != 0)
> - map_decision(tclass, avd);
> + /*
> + * If the tclass could not be mapped to a kernel class at all, the
> + * kernel will have already set avd according to the
> + * handle_unknown flag and we do not need to do anything further.
> + * Otherwise, we must map the permissions within the returned
> + * avd to the userspace permission values.
> + */
> + if (kclass != 0)
> + map_decision(tclass, avd, !security_deny_unknown());
We probably want to cache security_deny_unknown() and refresh it upon a
policy reload. If the callers were to use selinux_status_open() during
setup, they could get the current value via
selinux_status_deny_unknown() without requiring any further system
calls. Or if using netlink selinux notifications, they could call
security_deny_unknown() again only when they receive a
SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD message. Not clear how to best integrate it here
since security_compute_av*() can be called directly or via the AVC.
>
> ret = 0;
> out2:
> diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.c b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
> index f205804b..892f887e 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/mapping.c
> +++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.c
> @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@
> #include <stdarg.h>
> #include <selinux/selinux.h>
> #include <selinux/avc.h>
> +#include "callbacks.h"
> #include "mapping.h"
> +#include "selinux_internal.h"
>
> /*
> * Class and permission mappings
> @@ -33,6 +35,9 @@ selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map)
> size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
> security_class_t i, j;
> unsigned k;
> + bool print_unknown_handle = false;
> + bool reject = (security_reject_unknown() == 1);
> + bool deny = (security_deny_unknown() == 1);
>
> free(current_mapping);
> current_mapping = NULL;
> @@ -62,8 +67,16 @@ selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map)
> struct selinux_mapping *p_out = current_mapping + j;
>
> p_out->value = string_to_security_class(p_in->name);
> - if (!p_out->value)
> - goto err2;
> + if (!p_out->value) {
> + selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO,
> + "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
> + p_in->name);
> + if (reject)
> + goto err2;
> + p_out->num_perms = 0;
> + print_unknown_handle = true;
> + continue;
> + }
>
> k = 0;
> while (p_in->perms[k]) {
> @@ -74,13 +87,24 @@ selinux_set_mapping(struct security_class_mapping *map)
> }
> p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(p_out->value,
> p_in->perms[k]);
> - if (!p_out->perms[k])
> - goto err2;
> + if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
> + selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO,
> + "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
> + p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
> + if (reject)
> + goto err2;
> + print_unknown_handle = true;
> + }
> k++;
> }
> p_out->num_perms = k;
> }
>
> + if (print_unknown_handle)
> + selinux_log(SELINUX_INFO,
> + "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
> + deny ? "denied" : "allowed");
> +
> /* Set the mapping size here so the above lookups are "raw" */
> current_mapping_size = i;
> return 0;
> @@ -181,30 +205,49 @@ map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm)
> }
>
> void
> -map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
> +map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + bool allow_unknown)
> {
> if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
> - unsigned i;
> + struct selinux_mapping *mapping = ¤t_mapping[tclass];
> + unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
> access_vector_t result;
>
> - for (i=0, result=0; i<current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
> - if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
> + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
> + if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
> + result |= 1<<i;
> + if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
> result |= 1<<i;
> + }
> avd->allowed = result;
>
> - for (i=0, result=0; i<current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
> - if (avd->decided & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
> + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
> + if (avd->decided & mapping->perms[i])
> + result |= 1<<i;
> + if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
> result |= 1<<i;
> + }
> avd->decided = result;
>
> - for (i=0, result=0; i<current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
> - if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
> + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
> + if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
> result |= 1<<i;
> avd->auditallow = result;
>
> - for (i=0, result=0; i<current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
> - if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
> + for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
> + if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
> result |= 1<<i;
> + if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
> + result |= 1<<i;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Make sure we audit denials for any permission check
> + * beyond the mapping->num_perms since this indicates
> + * a bug in the object manager.
> + */
> + for (; i < (sizeof(result)*8); i++)
> + result |= 1<<i;
> avd->auditdeny = result;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/libselinux/src/mapping.h b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
> index 22a4ccaf..12ebb89f 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/mapping.h
> +++ b/libselinux/src/mapping.h
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> #define _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_
>
> #include <selinux/selinux.h>
> +#include <stdbool.h>
>
> /*
> * Get real, kernel values from mapped values
> @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ extern access_vector_t
> map_perm(security_class_t tclass, access_vector_t kperm);
>
> extern void
> -map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
> +map_decision(security_class_t tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + bool allow_unknown);
>
> #endif /* _SELINUX_MAPPING_H_ */
> diff --git a/libselinux/src/reject_unknown.c b/libselinux/src/reject_unknown.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000..5c1d3605
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/libselinux/src/reject_unknown.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <sys/types.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include "selinux_internal.h"
> +#include "policy.h"
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <limits.h>
> +
> +int security_reject_unknown(void)
> +{
> + int fd, ret, reject_unknown = 0;
> + char path[PATH_MAX];
> + char buf[20];
> +
> + if (!selinux_mnt) {
> + errno = ENOENT;
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/reject_unknown", selinux_mnt);
> + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
> + ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
> + close(fd);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &reject_unknown) != 1)
> + return -1;
> +
> + return reject_unknown;
> +}
> +
> +hidden_def(security_reject_unknown);
> diff --git a/libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h b/libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h
> index dfc421cc..70b5025d 100644
> --- a/libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h
> +++ b/libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h
> @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy)
> hidden_proto(security_getenforce)
> hidden_proto(security_setenforce)
> hidden_proto(security_deny_unknown)
> + hidden_proto(security_reject_unknown)
> hidden_proto(security_get_checkreqprot)
> hidden_proto(selinux_boolean_sub)
> hidden_proto(selinux_current_policy_path)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-22 16:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-22 14:41 [PATCH] libselinux: selinux_set_mapping: fix handling of unknown classes/perms Stephen Smalley
2019-02-22 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-02-22 16:14 ` Stephen Smalley
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