From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 11:20:48 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f3dea066-1f6d-4b92-1a5b-dac25b58aae7@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1de8338a-9c1c-c13b-16f0-e47ebec0e7ea@tycho.nsa.gov>
On 1/24/20 9:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 1/23/20 7:23 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
>> process security "context" in compound format:'
>> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
>> This entry is not writable.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
>
> As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation
> of getprocattr() particularly around the trailing newline that
> dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new
> interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using
> the existing getprocattr() hook lest it also be locked into the current
> behavior forever.
Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/context could also be leveraged by the SO_PEERCONTEXT
implementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent
result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for
/proc/self/attr/current versus SO_PEERSEC.
>
>> ---
>> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++++++++
>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>> security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> index aadf47c808c0..a4979060f5d3 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> @@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields:
>> - ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
>> - ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
>> +
>> +LSM External Interfaces
>> +=======================
>> +
>> +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
>> +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
>> +require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
>> +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This
>> +is provided in compound context format.
>> +
>> +- `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0`
>> +
>> +The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
>> +context of the identified process.
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 950c200cb9ad..d13c2cf50e4b 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
>> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
>> ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
>> + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0666),
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>> DIR("smack", 0555,
>> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 6a77c8b2ffbc..fdd0c85df89e 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -722,6 +722,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct
>> task_struct *task)
>> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
>> }
>> +/**
>> + * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
>> + * @ctx: the existing compound context
>> + * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
>> + * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
>> + * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
>> + * @newlen: maximum size of @new
>> + *
>> + * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
>> + * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
>> + * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
>> + */
>> +static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char
>> *new,
>> + int newlen)
>> +{
>> + char *final;
>> + int llen;
>> +
>> + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
>> + newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
>> +
>> + final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (final == NULL)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + if (*ctxlen)
>> + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
>> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
>> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
>> + kfree(*ctx);
>> + *ctx = final;
>> + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Hook list operation macros.
>> *
>> @@ -2041,6 +2077,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
>> const char *lsm, char *name,
>> char **value)
>> {
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + char *final = NULL;
>> + char *cp;
>> + int rc = 0;
>> + int finallen = 0;
>> int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>> int slot = 0;
>> @@ -2068,6 +2108,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
>> const char *lsm, char *name,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> }
>> + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
>> + list) {
>> + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "current", &cp);
>> + if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT)
>> + continue;
>> + if (rc < 0) {
>> + kfree(final);
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
>> + cp, rc);
>> + if (rc < 0) {
>> + kfree(final);
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + if (final == NULL)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + *value = final;
>> + return finallen;
>> + }
>> +
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-24 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20200124002306.3552-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:22 ` [PATCH v14 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 14:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 16:20 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-01-24 19:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 20:05 ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-03 20:54 ` John Johansen
2020-01-27 22:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-31 22:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 18:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 19:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-03 21:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-04 13:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-04 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 11:56 ` Simon McVittie
2020-02-10 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 14:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-10 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-10 19:00 ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 15:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-11 17:58 ` John Johansen
2020-02-11 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-11 19:11 ` John Johansen
2020-02-10 18:56 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:02 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 21:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-03 22:49 ` John Johansen
2020-02-03 20:59 ` John Johansen
2020-01-24 0:23 ` [PATCH v14 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24 15:05 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-24 21:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-27 16:14 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 16:56 ` KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Stephen Smalley
2020-01-27 17:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-27 17:16 ` [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
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